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Reform of the federal securities laws appears imminent. 1 Current
legislation in Congress seeks to curtail the fights of investors alleging
fraud claims under these laws against public issuers of securities.2 In
the aftermath of the reform, investors in certain instances might be
forced to return to the state courts in which they once sought corn-
* J.D., 1995; M.B.A., San Diego State University, 1992; B.A., San Diego State Uni-
versity, 1989. The author wishes to thank Professors Julian H. Levi, David I. Levine, and
William K.S. Wang for their assistance. Also, the author has special thanks for Judges
Barbara T. Ganer and William H. Orrick, Jr. for their inspiration and encouragement.
1. See, e.g., Jeff Gerth, Overhaul of Securities Laws: A Fast Track to Change or a
Hasty Decision?, N.Y. Tihms, May 26,1995, at A19; John Harwood, House, in 325-99 Vote
Approves Bill to Curb Fraud Suits Against Companies, WALL ST. J., Mar. 9, 1995, at A3;
Richard B. Schmitt, As Legal-Reform Legislation Heads For Senate, Trial-Lawyers Lobby
is Likely to Play Key Role, WA.Lu ST. J., Mar. 10, 1995, at A16; Richard B. Schmitt, GOP
Drive to Curb Liability Suits Emboldens the Business Lobbyists, WALL ST. J., Feb. 13,1995,
at B2 (discussing growth of corporate coalitions on legal reform issues being heard in Con-
gress); Jeffrey Taylor, Accountants' Campaign Contributions Are About to Pay Off in Legis-
lation on Lawsuit Protection, WALL ST. J., Mar. 8, 1995, at A22; Jeffrey Taylor, House
Committee Approves Bill Aimed at Curbing Suits Against Corporations, WALL ST. J., Feb.
17, 1995, at B4B; Jeffrey Taylor, Senate Clears Securities-Suit Curbs, WALL ST. J., June 29,
1995, at A3 (discussing Senate passage of securities-reform bill, to the chagrin of many
regulators who charge that the bill is a concession to accounting and securities firms); Jef-
frey Taylor, Senate Panel Clears Bill Limiting Investor Suits, WALL ST. J., May 26, 1995, at
A3.
2. See S. 240, 104th Cong., 1st. Sess. (1995) ("Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act of 1995" proposing to amend Securities Exchange Act of 1934 by, inter alia, increasing
standards of proof, modifying discovery rules to lengthen and increase the cost of securities
suits, creating a "safe harbor" for forward-looking statements later found false, abrogating
joint and several liability in a wide range of cases, and stiffening penalties for lawyers who
file suits later deemed meritless); H.R. 1058, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) ("Securities Liti-
gation Reform Act" proposing amendment substantially similar to S. 240).
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mon-law remedies before the development of the federal securities
laws. 3 Thus, courts in the future may be placing an increased focus on
common-law deceit principles and remedies fallen into disuse since
the enactment of the federal securities laws.4 The concept of market
reliance used in securities-fraud cases is one such principle.5 Recently,
the principle of market reliance was overlooked by the California
Supreme Court in the decision of Mirkin 1'. Wasserman.6 This Note
was written to ensure that practitioners and courts alike exercise spe-
cial vigilance in securities cases brought under the common law, so
that long-standing principles developed in the past do not unnecessa-
rily melt away.
To recover in a case for securities fraud, the plaintiff must plead
and prove that she relied on the defendant's misrepresentation. 7 This
necessary element of reliance, dating back centuries to the English
common law of deceit, can present an insurmountable barrier of proof
when the plaintiff is an investor who purchases or sells stock on a na-
tional securities exchange.8 For example, the plaintiff may not know
of certain fraudulent statements affecting the price of the stock at the
time of the transaction. Nonetheless, she may purchase or sell the
stock, trusting that its price at the time of the transaction is an accu-
rate reflection of its value, because the stock is traded on a national
exchange by investors everywhere. Assuming the defendant's mis-
chief affected the price of the stock in the open market at the time it
was purchased or sold by the plaintiff investor, when the investor
brings a suit for her losses based on the transaction, how will she
prove that she relied on the defendant's behavior? It was not defend-
ant's statement but rather the integrity of the market that she relied
upon in making the transaction.
To ensure an avenue of recovery for these investors, the United
States Supreme Court, in Basic, Inc. v. Levinson,9 held that a rebutta-
ble presumption of reliance may be established by pleading a "fraud-
on-the-market" theory' 0 in securities-fraud actions brought under fed-
eral law. An underlying tenet of this theory is that in open and well-
developed markets, like national exchanges, a security's price immedi-
ately responds to all known information (true or false) material to its
3. See infra Part III.
4. See infra Part III.
5. See infra Part III.
6. 858 P.2d 568 (Cal. 1993).
7. See infra note 60 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 63-64 and accompanying text.
9. 485 U.S. 224, 241 (1988).
10. The fraud-on-the-market theory, as employed in securities litigation today, is dis-
cussed at notes 77-90 infra and accompanying text.
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value." Therefore, assuming they believe the price of a security accu-
rately reflects its value, investors who enter transactions when false
information is affecting the price of a security indirectly rely on that
misrepresentation. 12 The fraud-on-the-market theory uses a principle
of "market '13 or "indirect"14 reliance.
The fraud-on-the-market theory evolved in federal courts in ac-
tions brought by investors under section 10(b) of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 ("1934 Act"), for alleged violations of Rule 10b-5,
a rule promulgated under section 10(b) by the Securities and Ex-
change Commission ("SEC").15 However, stock exchanges existed
well before the 1934 Act, and so did fraud. In these times before en-
actment of the federal securities laws, investors were often wrongfully
harmed by fraud but unable to frame their complaints to state a cause
of action because they were not in eye-to-eye contact with or did not
hear the words of the malfeasant.' 6 The common-law judges recog-
nized the varied forms of fraud occurring and the attendant problems
of proof in securities and other fraud cases. In response, these judges
employed principles, such as "market reliance," to give the investors a
proper chance for relief.17
The market-reliance principle employed in the fraud-on-the-mar-
ket theory was incorporated from England and used in the American
courts.' 8 However, after enactment of the federal securities laws,
courts rarely heard securities actions brought under the common law,
and the principle of market reliance fell into disuse.19 Until recently,
no state high court ever had decided whether it was proper to apply
common law market reliance principles in a securities fraud case.20 In
11. See infra note 88 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 72-76 and accompanying text.
13. See infra Part III.A.
14. See infra notes 128-30 and accompanying text; infra Part II.C.
15. See infra notes 50-62 and accompanying text.
16. See infra Part III.B.
17. See infra Part III.B.
18. See infra Part III.C.
19. See infra note 212 and accompanying text.
20. Courts considering the issue have divided into two camps. In the camp denying
the incorporation of the fraud-on-the-market theory into common-law fraud claims are
one state court, Gaffin v. Teledyne, Inc., 611 A2d 467,472 (Del. 1992), and several federal
courts deciding pendent state claims: In re Consol. Capital Sec. Litig., [1990 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 95,238, at 96,056 n.6 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 26, 1990); Cam-
mer v. Bloom, 711 F. Supp. 1264, 1277 (D.NJ. 1989); Gruber v. Price Waterhouse, 117
F.R.D. 75, 81 (E.D. Pa. 1987); In re ORFA Sec. Litig., 654 F. Supp. 1449, 1460 (D.NJ.
1987); Rosenberg v. Digilog, Inc., 648 F. Supp. 40,43-44 (E.D. Pa. 1985); In re Consumers
Power Co. Sec. Litig., 105 F.R.D. 583, 609 (E.D. Mich. 1985); McFarland v. Memorex
Corp., 96 F.R.D. 357, 364 (N.D. Cal. 1982).
In the camp applying market-reliance principles to common-law fraud claims are one
state court, Smith v. Central Bank & Trust Co., No. 90-CV-7642 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Nov. 13,
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1993, the California Supreme Court was presented with such an op-
portunity, in the case of Mirkin v. Wasserman.
21
In Mirkin, the court denied the applicability of the fraud-on-the-
market theory to a securities fraud class action alleging claims under
the California Civil Code.22 The claims in the Mirkin case were
brought on behalf of plaintiffs who bought securities of Maxicare
Health Plans, Inc. ("Maxicare"), a California corporation operating
health maintenance organizations.23 Plaintiffs alleged in their com-
plaint that they purchased Maxicare stock at a market price spuriously
inflated by defendants' 24 public misrepresentations that Maxicare's fi-
nancial status was flourishing. According to the plaintiffs, when the
truth that Maxicare was in financial disarray and sustaining losses of
more than $250 million a year became public knowledge, Maxicare's
stock price plummeted from more than $25 to nearly $1 per share.
25
Maxicare's officers, directors, underwriters, and accountants were
those named as engaging in deceit and negligent misrepresentation.
2 6
In their complaint, the plaintiffs specifically did not allege direct reli-
ance on the misrepresentations but instead pleaded reliance based on
the fraud-on-the-market theory. Essentially, the plaintiffs alleged that
in purchasing the Maxicare stock, they relied on the integrity of the
stock market, unbeknownst to them tainted by the defendants' fraud-
ulent statements. 27 Both the trial court and the court of appeal re-
jected the plaintiffs' use of the fraud-on-the-market theory and
refused to presume reliance on the misrepresentations.
28
The California Supreme Court upheld the decisions of the courts
below by refusing to establish a presumption of reliance under the
fraud-on-the-market theory in the claims brought by plaintiffs.29 Ap-
parently, the fear of punitive damages was a large factor driving the
1992), and several federal courts: In re Healthcare Servs. Group, Inc. Sec. Litig., [1993
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 97,374, at 95,978-79 (E.D. Pa. March 1, 1993);
In re Zenith Lab. Sec. Litig., [1993 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 97,617, at
96,824 (D.N.J. Feb. 11, 1993); Hurley v. FDIC, 719 F. Supp. 27, 34 n.4 (D. Mass. 1989);
Minpeco, S.A. v. Hunt, 718 F. Supp. 168, 176 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
21. 858 P.2d 568 (Cal. 1993).
22. Id. at 570.
23. Id. at 569.
24. The defendants included Maxicare's officers, directors, underwriters, and account-
ants. The outside parties were Ernst & Whinney; Montgomery Securities, Inc.; and Salo-
mon Brothers, Inc. Id at 569-70. Ernst & Whinney (succeeded by Ernst & Young)
audited Maxicare's financial statements. Id. Montgomery Securities and Salomon Broth-
ers underwrote the public offerings of Maxicare's securities, which occurred in 1985 and
1986. Id.
25. Id. at 570.
26. See supra note 24.
27. Mirkin, 858 P.2d at 570.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 584.
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Mirkin court's decision.30 Punitive damages are not available under
federal or state securities laws. 31 However, in trials for common-law
fraud, judges have discretion in permitting the jury to award punitive
damages, which could impose draconian penalties on defendants in
cases of securities fraud.32 In Mirkin, the court expressed its concern
that the specter of punitive damages in securities fraud cases would
skew California law in favor of investors by increasing the settlement
value of marginal claims.33 According to the court, this would unnec-
essarily disrupt California businesses by increasing the number of friv-
olous securities-fraud suits.34 In discussing these policy concerns, the
court stated it would not upset legislatively created balances between
the interests of investors and businesses by recognizing the "fraud-on-
the-market" theory.
35
Deferring to the legislature in deciding whether to enhance inves-
tors' remedies under California law was within the realm of the court's
discretion.3 6 However, it appears the court incorrectly rendered its
analysis of existing deceit law in arriving at this issue. The Mirkin
court concluded that the California law of deceit required proof of
actual reliance in all cases. 37 In so doing, it applied a strained analysis
of several California class actions involving allegations of fraud.3 8 In
these previous cases the California Supreme Court allowed plaintiffs
an inference of reliance because they received the harmful false infor-
mation only indirectly.39 The Mirkin court refused to apply an indi-
rect reliance analysis and failed to acknowledge these well-established
market-reliance principles. Before the existence of federal securities
laws and the fraud-on-the-market theory, judges applying the com-
mon law of deceit used market-reliance principles.40 Reading the
court's opinion gives one the impression that before enactment of the
federal securities laws, defrauded investors who bought stock in open
securities markets were left with no remedy. This was not so.
30. See id. at 582-83; Scott Graham, "Market Fraud" Theory Gets Cool Reception
From High Cour; Tr RECORDER (S.F.), June 17, 1993, at 1 (noting that at oral argument,
the supreme court justices asked plaintiffs' counsel whether the availability of punitive
damages under common-law claims influenced their decision to file in state court).
31. Mirkin, 858 P.2d at 582.
32. Id. at 583.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 582 (citing Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 488 (Cal. 1990)).
36. See John W. Poulos, The Judicial Philosophy of Roger Traynor, 46 HASTINGs. L.J.
1643, 1708-10 (1995) (discussing jurisprudence of court deference to legislatures).
37. Mirkin, 858 P.2d at 572-78.
38. See id. at 586-93 (Kennard, J., concurring and dissenting). This was the dissenting
Justice's primary criticism of the court's decision.
39. See infra notes 128-42 and accompanying text.
40. See infra Part II.B.
FRAUD ON THE MARKETAugust 1995]
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
Because the California Supreme Court is the first high court to
decide whether to presume reliance in securities-fraud cases brought
under state law, other state high courts will examine its opinion.
These courts should realize that the Mirkin court may have been un-
duly influenced by the policies disfavoring punitive damages when it
decided the state of the common law. The threat of punitive damages
in securities fraud class actions brought under the common law of de-
ceit poses justifiable concern. However, judges for years have wisely
exercised their discretion in deciding the availability of such remedies,
and legislatures have aptly demonstrated their willingness to imple-
ment limits on punitive damages when necessary. Because many state
legislatures have already articulated policies on punitive damages, the
uncertain effect of such a remedy in securities fraud class actions
brought in these states need not drive analysis of the substantive law.
Even in states lacking legislative guidance on punitive damages limita-
tions, courts must not circumvent the long-standing availability of pu-
nitive damages in certain egregious fraud cases by refusing to
recognize market-reliance principles in the common law of deceit.
This Note contends that market-reliance principles exist in the
common law of deceit and that courts should apply these principles in
securities-fraud cases. There are a number of ways courts may deal
with the issue of punitive damages in securities fraud class actions,
none of which should preclude the underlying cause of action. Part I
of this Note discusses the development of the fraud-on-the-market
theory and its application in securities-fraud suits. Part II examines
the California Supreme Court's decision in Mirkin v. Wasserman. Part
III demonstrates that market-reliance principles exist in the common
law of deceit. Finally, Part IV shows that courts need not be daunted
by the prospect of punitive damages when deciding whether to apply a
presumption of reliance in common-law securities fraud cases.
1. Federal Securities Laws and Development of the "Fraud
on the Market" Theory
The fraud on the market theory is based on the hypothesis that,
in an open and developed securities market, the price of a com-
pany's stock is determined by the available material information re-
garding the company and its business .... Misleading statements
will therefore defraud purchasers of stock even if the purchasers do
not directly rely on the misstatements .... The causal connection
between the defendants' fraud and the plaintiffs' purchase of the
stock in such a case is no less significant than in a case of direct
reliance on misrepresentations. 41
41. Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 241-42 (1988) (quoting Peil v. Speiser, 806
F.2d 1154, 1160-61 (3d Cir. 1986)).
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To understand why this theory evolved in the federal courts, it is
important to consider the development of the securities laws and in-
vestors rights under those laws, leading to the case of Basic, Inc. v.
Levinson.42
The Seventy-Third Congress enacted the federal securities laws
largely in response to the stock market crash of 1929. Congress real-
ized that investors needed to be protected against fraud, and that reg-
ulatory control in the securities markets might have lessened the
severity of the 1929 stock market crash.43 This prompted Congress's
interest in preventing practices that destabilize the securities mar-
kets44 and protecting market prices from "manipulation or control."45
The Securities Act of 193346 and the Securities Exchange Act of
193447 ("the Acts") established systems requiring full disclosure of
material information by companies transacting in securities.48 The
Acts also created several mechanisms of enforcement, including the
42. Id. at 224.
43. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976) (citing H.R. REP. No.
83, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1, at 1-5 (1933)) (Congress intended to encourage "fair dealing").
This was evinced by the drafters' self-described purpose of the 1934 Act:
[T]o prevent further exploitation of the public by the sale of unsound, fraudulent,
and worthless securities through misrepresentation; to place adequate and true
information before the investor; to protect honest enterprise, seeking capital by
honest presentation, against the competition afforded by dishonest securities of-
fered to the public through crooked promotion.
S. REP. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1933).
44. See H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1934); S. RaP. No. 792, 73d Cong.,
2d Sess. 3 (1934).
45. S. REP. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 81 (1934).
46. See 15 U.S.C. § 77a (1988).
47. See 15 U.S.C. § 78a (1988).
48. See e.g., Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 206 (describing the Acts as "interrelated compo-
nents of the federal regulatory scheme governing transactions in securities"). The 1933 Act
requires company registration and disclosure of information in connection with the public
offering of securities. The 1934 Act requires continuing disclosure of information from
companies registered under the 1933 Act. For a complete discussion of the disclosure sys-
tem under the Acts, see HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL IET AL., SECURITIES LAW HANDBOOK
§ 3, at 59-106 (1995).
Mandating company disclosure of material information facilitates operation of the
capital markets by promoting investor confidence that investments in securities are made
at a price accurately reflecting value. The most widely supported theory underlying the
securities laws' mandatory disclosure requirements is the "efficient capital markets hypoth-
esis." This theory states that the market price of a company's stock reflects all information
that could be known about the company. For a full discussion of the efficient market hy-
pothesis, see RICHARD W. JENNINGS & HAROLD MARSH, JR., SEcuimrEs REGULATION:
CASES AND MATERIALS 163-67 (5th ed. 1982); John M. Salmanowitz, Note, Broker Invest-
ment Recommendations and the Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis: A Proposed Caution-
ary Legend, 29 STAN. L. REv. 1077, 1089-92 (1977).
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SEC, which is an independent regulatory agency charged with ad-
ministering and enforcing the securities laws.
49
The SEC promulgated Rule 10b-5 in 1942 under its delegated
rule-making authority provided in section 10(b) 50 of the 1934 Act.
51
The Rule is a broad-ranging52 anti-fraud provision liberally applied by
courts to achieve the remedial purposes of the 1934 Act.53 In the sem-
49. See BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 48, § 1.01, at 1.
50. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1988). Section 10(b) states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility
of any national securities exchange-
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules
and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in
the public interest or for the protection of investors.
Id. (emphasis added).
51. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1994). Rule 10b-5 states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility
of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the cir-
cumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.
Id
The rule was designed to cure a loophole in the coverage of the Acts' anti-fraud provi-
sions. See 8 SEC ANN. REP. 10 (1942) (Rule 10b-5 "prohibits fraud by any person in con-
nection with the purchase of securities, while the previously existing rules against fraud in
the purchase of securities applied only to brokers"). For an interesting historical note re-
garding the promulgation of Rule 10b-5, see 2 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURI-
TIES REGULATION § 13.2, at 62-63 n.22 (2d ed. 1990) (after hearing of a company president
who knew his company would quadruple its earnings and was buying up the stock while
telling shareholders that the earnings forecast was gloomy, the Commissioners met that
day, and after passing around the draft of the Rule they all looked at each other and one of
them said, "Well, we are against fraud, aren't we?").
52. It has been commented that the Rule proscribes anything "bad" in connection
with the purchase or sale of securities. See, e.g., Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792, 804 (5th
Cir. 1970). Although the statement "fraud in connection with the sale of securities" seem-
ingly adequately describes the broadness of Rule 10b-5, courts recognize distinctions be-
tween the (a), (b) & (c) prongs. See, e.g., Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S.
128, 152-53 (1972) (distinguishing the second subparagraph of Rule 10b-5 as more restric-
tive than the first and third subparagraphs of the Rule).
53. See Affiliated Ute, 406 U.S. at 151 (section 10(b) should be read "not technically
and restrictively, but flexibly to effectuate its remedial purposes"). However, in the last
two decades the United States Supreme Court has also curtailed the scope of private im-
plied remedies under Rule 10b-5. See, e.g., Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 228
(1980) (when there is nondisclosure, as in the insider trading context, the defendant will be
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inal case of Kardon v. National Gypsum Co.,5 4 a federal court implied
a private right of action under the Rule. Afterwards, Rule 10b-5 be-
came an especially powerful tool of securities-fraud enforcement be-
cause investors had gained rights to sue under it. 5
Because the Rule 10b-5 private action is judge-made law, the
Rule itself is silent in specifying the necessary elements of proof to
recover for a violation. Consequently, the courts have interpreted a
cause of action modeled after the common law of deceit.5 6 The basic
elements of a claim under Rule 10b-5 are a knowing57 misrepresenta-
liable only if a duty to disclose exists); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193
(1976) (scienter must be proven to establish 10b-5 claim); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor
Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 731 (1975) (plaintiff(s) must have purchased or sold securities in
question to have standing).
54. 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947). Probably the most effective watchdog mecha-
nism working in conjunction with Rule 10b-5 is the judicially created private right of action
under section 10(b). Because the SEC lacks the capability to police the vast community of
corporate securities issuers, the plaintiffs' bar is a valuable supplement to agency's enforce-
ment powers.
55. See Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 730 (private right of action aids SEC enforce-
ment). As a respected corporate defense lawyer has noted, "there is no way the [Securities
and Exchange Commission] can go after everybody-they need the help of the private
bar." Brent Bowers & Udayan Gupta, Shareholder Suits Beset More Small Companies,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 9, 1994, at Bi (quoting Boris Feldman, partner with the Palo Alto firm
of Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati). The private right of action was conclusively estab-
lished by the Supreme Court's decision in J.I Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 476 (1964). Not
long after the Borak decision, the private right of action had become the most widely
invoked provision in the securities laws, with respect to civil suits for damages. See Blue
Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 737 (discussing effect of private right of action on Rule 10b-5).
56. Dean Prosser described the elements of a deceit claim as:
1. A false representation made by the defendant. In the ordinary case, this
representation must be one of fact.
2. Knowledge or belief on the part of the defendant that the representation
is false .... [the technical name of which is] "scienter."
3. An intention to induce the plaintiff to act or to refrain from acting in
reliance upon the misrepresentation.
4. Justifiable reliance upon the representation on the part of the plaintiff, in
taking action or refraining from it.
5. Damage to the plaintiff, resulting from such reliance.
W. PAGE KEETON Er AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 105, at 728 (5th
ed. 1984).
57. In the securities litigation arena, this element is more commonly known as scien-
ter. A Rule 10b-5 claim must allege scienter. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185,
193 (1976).
The Supreme Court has explicitly left open the question whether the scienter require-
ment is satisfied by a showing of recklessness. Id. at 194 n.12. However, several Circuit
Courts of Appeals have held recklessness sufficient to demonstrate scienter. See McLean
v. Alexander, 599 F.2d 1190, 1197 & n.12 (3rd Cir. 1979) (listing cases).
August 1995]
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tion58 of a material fact5 9 upon which the plaintiff relied,60 and that
caused6 the plaintiff's injury.62
It is the element of reliance that implicates the fraud-on-the-mar-
ket theory. Understanding how the theory evolved requires appreci-
ating the practical difficulty of proving reliance in cases in which
investors purchasing stock on a vast and open securities market have
lost money because of a fraudulent act. When direct negotiations be-
tween a defendant buyer and plaintiff seller are the factual basis for
the claim, establishing reliance is elementary: the plaintiff alleges that
she heard and relied on the defendant's misrepresentations in trans-
acting the security.63 Compare this with investors buying or selling
securities in an open and impersonal market, relying on a price dis-
58. Liability may also be predicated on omission or nondisclosure. See infra note 69
and accompanying text.
59. See TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 444 (1976) (establishing re-
quirement of materiality in securities fraud case). Materiality is proved by showing that the
reasonable person "would attach importance [to the information misrepresented] in deter-
mining his choice of action in the transaction in question." List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340
F.2d 457, 462 (2d Cir. 1965) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 538(2)(a)
(1977)), cert. denied sub. nom List v. Lerner, 382 U.S. 811 (1965); accord Little v. Valley
Nat'l Bank, 650 F.2d 218, 222 (9th Cir. 1981).
60. Reliance bears a close relationship to materiality, both of which are a part of
transaction causation. See infra note 61. Materiality is the objective test of reliance, the
inquiry being whether a reasonable person would have acted on the misinformation. See,
e.g., List, 340 F.2d at 462 (applying definition of materiality from RESTATEMENT OF TORTS
(SECOND) § 538(2)(a)); Little, 650 F.2d at 222. In determining reliance, courts look at
whether the plaintiff acted on the misinformation. For a further discussion of reliance, see
BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 48, § 13.6, at 101-02.
61. Courts generally bifurcate causation into "transaction" and "loss" types. See
Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374, 380 (2d Cir. 1974) (describing the re-
quirements of both loss and transaction causation), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 976 (1975); 2
HAZEN, supra note 51, § 13.6, at 703 (listing cases expressly separating causation into the
two categories). Transaction causation is the causa sine qua non of the investment or sale:
but for the act of the defendant's conduct, the transaction in particular would not have
occurred. This part of causation is related to reliance, insofar as the defendant's conduct
induced the transaction. See Harris v. Union Elec. Co., 787 F.2d 355, 366 (7th Cir. 1986)
(equating transaction causation with reliance); 2 HAZEN, supra note 51, § 13.6, at 105-06
(discussing reliance, inducement, and transaction causation). Loss causation is shown by
establishing that the plaintiff's loss was rooted in the fraud alleged. See, e.g., Huddleston v.
Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534,549 (5th Cir. 1981), affd on other grounds, 459 U.S. 375
(1983). The malefaction must relate to the source, at least in part, of the security's decline
in value.
62. Huddleston, 640 F.2d at 543 ("To make out a claim under Section 10(b), which is
based on the common law action of deceit, the plaintiff must establish (1) a misstatement
or an omission (2) of material fact (3) made with scienter (4) on which the plaintiff relied
(5) that proximately caused his injury.").
63. See, e.g., Kardon v. Nat'l Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512,514 (E.D. Pa. 1946) (com-
plaint brought under Rule 10b-5 held to state a cause of action where it alleged that de-
fendants made misrepresentations in face-to-face negotiation, inducing plaintiffs to sell
their stock).
[Vol. 46
torted by a misrepresentation, omission, or a failure-to disclose. Es-
tablishing reliance in this context would be virtually impossible,
because the plaintiffs would likely never have seen or heard the de-
fendant.64 Yet the broad language of Rule 10b-5 prohibits fraud "in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security."65 To effectuate
Rule 10b-5's proscription of fraud, courts began articulating a less de-
manding standard of reliance in securities-fraud suits brought under
Rule 10b-5.66
Perhaps the beginning of federal courts' development of fraud-
on-the-market principles occurred in 1968, in SEC v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co. In Texas Gulf Sulphur, the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit held that misrepresentations or omissions
contained in publicly available documents fell within the ambit of
Rule 10b-5. 67 Several years later, in Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United
States, the United States Supreme Court eased the reliance require-
ment in suits brought under Rule 10b-5 "involving primarily a failure
to disclose. '68 The Court held that when a defendant is obligated to
disclose, "[t]he withholding of a material fact establish[es] the requi-
site element of causation in fact."' 69 Expressly marking the departure
from the classic tort requirement of reliance, Justice Blackmun stated
64. Proof of reliance would also be impractical due to the large number of plaintiffs
who may have traded on the exchange. In cases like this, the investors join in a class
action. See FED. R. Cw. P. 23. However, requiring individual investors to prove direct
reliance would nullify the use of the class action device, because it is designed to litigate
such an issue on a common basis. Se4 e.g., Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 895-900 (9th
Cir. 1975) (discoursing extensively on the application of the class action device in a securi-
ties fraud case), cert denied, 429 U.S. 816 (1976). Many courts have recognized the impor-
tance of class actions to securities regulation enforcement. See, e.g., In re United States
Fin. Sec. Litig., 69 F.R.D. 24,43 (S.D. Cal. 1975); Grad v. Memorex Corp., 61 F.R.D. 88, 98
(N.D. Cal. 1973). Without the class action device it would be infeasible for small loss inves-
tors to pursue claims. See id. at 98-99 (citing Escott v. Barchris Constr. Corp., 340 F.2d 731,
733 (2d. Cir. 1965), cert. denied sub nom. Drexel & Co. v. Hall, 382 U.S. 816 (1966)). This
was one reason for establishing the "fraud on the market" theory.
65. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1988).
66. However, centuries before enactment of the federal securities laws, common-law
judges were facing a similar dilemma in attempting to ensure remedies for defrauded in-
vestors. See infra Part m.A-B.
67. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied sub nom. Coates v. SEC, 394
U.S. 976 (1969).
68. 406 U.S. 128, 153 (1972). el
69. Id. at 154 (citing Chasins v. Smith, Barney & Co., 438 F.2d 1167, 1172 (2d Cir.
1970). The precursor to the reasoning of the courts in Chasins and Affiliated Ute was likely
established by the Second Circuit in List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462 (1965),
cert. denied sub nom. List v. Lerner, 382 U.S. 811 (1965). The List court's test for reliance
was "whether the plaintiff," and the reasonable person, "would have been influenced to act
differently than he did act if the defendant had disclosed to him the undisclosed fact." 340
F.2d at 463.
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that "positive proof of reliance is not a prerequisite to recovery.
'"70
Lower courts embraced this flexible concept of reliance.
71
Less than a decade after the Texas Gulf Sulphur case, the Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in Blackie v. Barrack,72 originated
the version of the fraud-on-the-market theory eventually ratified by
the United States Supreme Court. The plaintiffs in Blackie alleged
that they purchased stock in the defendants' company at a price in-
flated above its value by defendants' misrepresentations regarding the
company's financial status, in the annual report and other publicly dis-
closed corporate filings. 73 The plaintiffs stated that they relied on the
price of the stock, which was traded on the New York Stock Ex-
change, as an accurate representation of the company's value.74 In
discussing its theory of reliance, the court stated:,
A purchaser on the stock exchanges may be either unaware of a
specific false representation, or may not directly rely on it; he may
purchase because of a favorable price trend, price earning ratio, or
some other factor. Nevertheless, he relies generally on the supposi-
tion that the market price is validly set and that no unsuspected
manipulation has artificially inflated the price, and thus indirectly on
the truth of the representations underlying the stock price-
whether he is aware of it or not, the price he pays reflects material
misrepresentations. 75
The Blackie case marked the beginning of federal courts' application
of fraud-on-the-market principles in securities fraud cases.
76
The Supreme Court addressed the viability of the fraud-on-the-
market theory in Basic, Inc. v. Levinson.77 The defendant, Basic, Inc.
("Basic"), was involved in confidential merger negotiations with a
70. Affiliated Ute, 406 U.S. at 153.
71. See, e.g., Vervaecke v. Chiles, Heider & Co., 578 F.2d 713, 717 (8th Cir. 1978);
Rifkin v. Crowe, 574 F.2d 256, 262 (5th Cir. 1978); Holdsworth v. Strong, 545 F.2d 687, 695
(10th Cir. 1976); Blackie, 524 F.2d at 905-06; Titan Group v. Faggen, 513 F.2d 234, 238 (2d
Cir. 1975).
72. 524 F.2d 891 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 816 (1976).
73. 524 F.2d at 894.
74. Id. at 906.
75. Id. at 907 (emphasis added).
76. See, e.g., Finkel v. Docutel/Olivetti Corp., 817 F.2d 356, 362 (5th Cir. 1987) (fraud-
on-the-market theory asserted on request for class certification), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 959
(1988); Levinson v. Basic, Inc., 786 F.2d 741, 750 (6th Cir. 1986) (same), vacated on other
grounds, 485 U.S. 224 (1988); In re Western Union Sec. Litig., 120 F.R.D. 629, 634 (D.N.J.
1988) (same); Lipton v. Documentation, Inc., 734 F.2d 740, 745 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. de-
nied, 469 U.S. 1132 (1985); T.J. Raney & Sons, Inc. v. Fort Cobb, Okla. Fuel Irr. Auth., 717
F.2d 1330, 1333 (10th Cir. 1983), cert. denied sub nom. Linde, Thompson, Fairchild, Lang-
worthy, Kohn, & Van Dyke v. T.J. Raney & Sons, Inc., 465 U.S. 1026 (1984); Panzirer v.
Wolf, 663 F.2d 365, 367 (2nd Cir. 1981), cert. granted sub nom. Price Waterhouse v.
Panzirer, 458 U.S. 1105,judgment vacated and compl dismissed, 459 U.S. 1027 (1982); In re
LTV Sec. Litig., 88 F.R.D. 134, 146 (N.D. Tex. 1980).
77. 485 U.S. 224 (1978).
1978 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 46
prospective acquirer, when rumors of the pending merger stimulated
heavy trading, and the price of Basic's stock increased significantly.78
Subsequently, Basic made three public statements: the first a denial
that merger negotiations were underway; and two later statements
that the company did not know what accounted for the high trading
volume and price fluctuations in its stock.79 Tihe plaintiffs brought
claims under Rule 10b-5, alleging that had they known a merger was
in fact pending, they would have sold their stock later in order to gain
an additional premium, but instead sold their stock in reliance upon
the disclaimers of Basic.80
Justice Blackmun wrote the opinion of the court, in which he and
several Justices approved of the fraud-on-the-market theory.8 ' After
discussing the issue of the materiality of Basic's statements, Justice
Blackmun addressed the question whether reliance would present a
barrier to plaintiffs' claims.82 The Court first noted that requiring in-
dividual proof of reliance by each class member would result in fore-
going a class action.83 The Court agreed with Basic that proof of
reliance was required but stated that reliance, which provides the req-
uisite causal connection between a defendant's behavior and a plain-
tiff's injuries, could be demonstrated by means other than
individualized proof.84 Justice Blackmun stated that because modem
securities markets were far different from the one-on-one trading con-
text typically occurring when the reliance requirement originated in
the law of deceit, the requirement should reflect this difference.8 5 He
noted that presumptions, "[a]rising out of considerations of fairness,
public policy, and probability, as well as judicial economy," assist
courts when direct proof is difficult, as it would be in a securities fraud
class action if each class member had to demonstrate individual reli-
ance.86 In the view of the Court, allowing a rebuttable presumption of
reliance in such cases would be consistent with facilitating Rule 10b-5
litigation and would support Congress' policy of promoting fair and
78. Id. at 227.
79. Id. at 227-28.
80. Id. at 228.
81. Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens joined in the opinion regarding the fraud-
on-the-market theory; Justice White and Justice O'Connor dissented. Noteworthy is that
three conservative justices, Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Scalia, and Justice Kennedy,
took no part in the case.
82. Basic 485 U.S. at 241.
83. ILd. at 242; see supra note 64.
84. Id. at 243-47.
85. Id. at 243-44 & n.22. Justice Blackmun cited Blackie and several other influential
lower court opinions for the proposition that reliance on the integrity of the market price
may be presumed in the modem, impersonal securities market context. See id. at 247 &
n.25 (listing cases).
86. Id. at 245.
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efficient markets. 87 In concluding its discussion of the fraud-on-the-
market theory, the Court observed that empirical studies on modem
securities markets confirmed Congress's premise underlying the pol-
icy, which was that "well-developed" markets reflect all publicly avail-
able information.88
Thus, in applying the fraud-on-the-market theory, as stated in Ba-
sic, a plaintiff must prove: (1) that the defendant made a public mis-
representation or omission; (2) that the misrepresentation or omission
was material; (3) that the security was traded in an open and well-
87. Id. at 245-46. A House report prepared for consideration of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 was quoted by the Court:
No investor, no speculator, can safely buy and sell securities upon the ex-
changes without having an intelligent basis for forming his judgement as to the
value of the securities he buys or sells. The idea of a free and open public market
is built upon the theory that competing judgements of buyers and sellers as to the
fair price of a security brings [sic] about a situation where the market price re-
flects as nearly as possible a just price. Just as artificial manipulation tends to
upset the true function of an open market, so the hiding and secreting of impor-
tant information obstructs the operation of the markets as indices of real value.
Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934)) (correction in Court's
opinion).
88. Id. at 246 & n.24 (citing cases and studies discussing the theory of "efficient capital
markets"). It is important to note that Justice Blackmun did not accept the purported
validity of the studies in adopting the fraud-on-the-market theory:
We need not determine by adjudication what economists and social scientists
have debated through the use of sophisticated statistical analysis and the applica-
tion of economic theory. For purposes of accepting the presumption of reliance
in this case, we need only believe that market professionals generally consider
most publicly announced material statements about companies, thereby affecting
stock market prices.
Id. at 246-27 n.24. As discussed in this note, many years earlier, common-law judges must
also have arrived at the same conclusion without the aid of these economic and financial
theories. See infra Part III.B-C.
However, knowing the basic concept of the "efficient capital markets hypothesis"
("ECMH") is helpful to understanding the fraud-on-the-market theory. When prices in a
securities market reflect all material public information, the market is termed as "effi-
cient." There are three forms of the ECMH endorsed in the economic and financial com-
munities. Apparently, the most popular ("semi-strong") version of the theory is that
accepted in the courts. The "semi-strong" version of the ECMH states all current market
prices reflect all publicly available information. Prices adjust as soon as information is
released. In the "weak" version, prices adjust to reflect public information more slowly,
and in the "strong" version, prices immediately respond to both public and private infor-
mation. For articles and books discussing market valuation and the ECMH, see RICHARD
A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 289-96 (4th ed.
1991); JOHN BURR WILLIAMs, THE THEORY OF INVESTMENT VALUE 33-37 (1938); Eugene
F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. FnN.
383-417 (1970) (extensive theoretical analysis); Myron J. Gordon & Eli Shapiro, Capital
Equipment Analysis: The Required Rate of Profit, 3 MGMT. SCi. 102-10 (1956). For criti-
cism of the use of the ECMH as support for the fraud-on-the-market theory, see Andrew
R. Simmonds et al., Dealing with Anomalies, Confusion and Contradiction in Fraud on the
Market Securities Class Actions, 81 Ky. L.J. 123, 142-54 & nn.63-113 (1993).
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developed market; (4) that the plaintiff(s) bought or sold the security
between the making of the misrepresentation or omission and the dis-
covery of the malefaction; and (5) that the plaintiff(s) sustained a loss
as a result of the malefaction. 89 After the plaintiff establishes these
elements, the defendant may "rebut proof of the elements giving rise
to the presumption," or rebut application of the presumption as to
individual plaintiffs by showing they would have traded the security
despite knowing that the statement was false.90
Remedies for Rule 10b-5 plaintiffs are limited to actual dam-
ages.91 However, this figure may vary greatly depending on the
method employed in measuring the damages and the circumstances of
the transaction.92 No universal method has been accepted by the
courts. A commonly employed damages measure in fraud-on-the-
market cases is "out-of-pocket" damages.93 In this instance, the court
estimates the true value of the stock at the time of the tainted transac-
tion. The award given plaintiffs is the difference between the true
value at the time of the transaction and the spurious price for which
they bought or sold the stock.94 The "true value" of a stock is difficult
to estimate because a number of factors affect value. The factfinder
89. Basiq 485 U.S. at 247 & n.27.
90. Id. at 247; see also BLoovmHAL, supra note 48, § 17.02[2], at 691. To illustrate
how the presumption could be rebutted as to an individual plaintiff, the court stated:
For example, a plaintiff who believed that Basic's statements were false and that
Basic was indeed engaged in merger discussion, and who consequently believed
that Basic stock was artificially underpriced, but sold his shares nevertheless be-
cause of other unrelated concerns... could not be said to have relied on the
integrity of a price he knew had been manipulated.
Id. at 248.
91. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1988).
92. As noted in stating the elements of a Rule 10b-5 action, which is judicially im-
plied, there is no statutorily prescribed method of measuring damages. For descriptions
and commentary regarding the differing measures of actual damages, see generally JESSE
H. CHOPER ET AL., CASES & MATERIALS ON COPoRAIoNs 415-19 (4th ed. 1995); Rict-
ARD W. JENNINGS ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION 1341-43 (7th ed. 1992); Frank H.
Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Optimal Damages in Securities Cases, 52 U. CI. L. REv.
611 (1985); Robert Thompson, The Measure of Recovery Under Rule 10b-5: A Restitution
Alternative to Tort Damages, 37 VAND. L. REv. 349 (1984).
93. See, e.g., Astor Chauffered Limousine Co. v. Rumfield Inv. Corp., 910 F.2d 1540,
1551 (7th Cir. 1990); Wool v. Tandem Computers Inc., 818 F.2d 1433, 1437 (9th Cir. 1987);
Hackbart v. Holmes, 675 F.2d 1114, 1121 (10th Cir. 1982); Glick v. Campagna, 613 F.2d 31,
35 (3d Cir. 1979); Green v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 541 F.2d 1335, 1344 (9th Cir.
1976); Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 908-09 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 816
(1976); Madigan, Inc. v. Goodman, 498 F.2d 233,239 (7th Cir. 1974); Zeller v. Bogue Elec.
Mfg. Corp., 476 F.2d 795, 801-02 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 908 (1973); Levine v.
Seilon, Inc., 439 F.2d 328, 334 (2d Cir. 1971); Estate Counsel. Serv., Inc. v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 303 F.2d 527, 533 (10th Cir. 1962).
94. See, e.g., Woo4 818 F.2d at 1437; Blackie, 524 F.2d at 908-09; see also COPER,
supra note 92, at 415; JENNI s, supra note 92, at 1341-43; Easterbrook & Fischel, supra
note 92, at 630; Thompson, supra note 92, at 356-60.
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often considers evidence from a number of sources, including expert
testimony and the market price of the stock itself.95 Most courts em-
ploying an out-of-pocket measure impose upon plaintiffs a duty to
mitigate their damages under a "cover" theory.96 Other measures of
actual damages include the "benefit-of-the-bargain" measure,97 "re-
scissory" or "rescissionary" damages, 98 and "disgorgement." 99 Puni-
tive damages are not available in Rule 10b-5 actions because courts
have interpreted section 28(a)100 under the 1934 Act as limiting recov-
ery in these cases to actual damages. 101
95. See, e.g., Blackie, 524 F.2d at 909 n.25.
96. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90, 105 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971). When cover is used, the plaintiff seller may recover damages
for appreciation in the stock sold only for a reasonable time after the plaintiff discovered
the fraud. Id. Likewise, the plaintiff buyer may only recover damages for depreciation in
the stock purchased only for a reasonable time period after the fraud is discovered, Id
97. See, e.g., Hackbart, 675 F.2d at 1121-22; John R. Lewis, Inc. v. Newman, 446 F.2d
800, 801, 805 (5th Cir. 1971); Norte & Co. v. Huffines, 288 F. Supp. 855, 864 (S.D.N.Y.
1968), modified, 416 F.2d 1189 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970). The bene-
fit-of-the-bargain measure is the difference between market value and a reasonable certain
estimate of the value of the security had the misrepresentation been true. See Hackbart,
675 F.2d at 1121-22.
98. See, e.g., Pidcock v. Sunnyland America, Inc., 854 F.2d 443 (11th Cir. 1988); Rowe
v. Maremont Corp., 850 F.2d 1226, 1243 (7th Cir. 1988); Glick v. Campagna, 613 F.2d 31,37
(3d Cir. 1979) ("court may award rescissory damages to place the plaintiff in the same
financial position he would have been were it possible to return the stock"); Blackie, 524
F.2d at 909 (in appropriate circumstances, judge may apply a rescissionary measure). Re-
scissory damages effectively "undo" the transaction by allowing plaintiffs to recover from
defendants the gains of the transaction. See Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d
534, 554 (5th Cir. 1981), modified on other grounds, 459 U.S. 375 (1983). Plaintiff sellers
may recover their stock for the price at which they sold, and plaintiff buyers may exchange
their stock for the price at which they bought. See JENNINGS & MARSH, supra note 48, at
1384-85 (discussing authority for defrauded plaintiffs to rescind transactions under Rule
10b-5); see also Huddleston, 640 F.2d at 554 (dictum).
99. See, e.g., Hackbart, 675 F.2d at 1122; Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 746 (8th Cir.
1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968); Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781, 786-87 (1st Cir.),
cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879 (1965). Disgorgement measures plaintiff's damages by the profit
of the defendant when the defendant sells the stock, or had defendant sold the stock given
the present market price. See Randall v. Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. 647, 663 (1986) (dictum)
(citing and quoting Affiliated Ute); Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128,
155 (1972) ("where the defendant received more than the seller's actual loss .... damages
are the amount of defendant's profit") (dictum).
100. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1988). Section 28(a) provides:
[N]o person permitted to maintain a suit for damages under the provisions of this
chapter shall recover, through satisfaction of judgment in one or more actions, a
total amount in excess of his actual damages on account of the act complained of.
Id. This is commonly known as the "one satisfaction" rule. See Thompson, supra note 92,
at 359.
101. See, e.g., Grogan v. Garner, 806 F.2d 829, 838 (8th Cir. 1986) (dictum); Osofsky v.
Zipf, 645 F.2d 107, 111 (2d Cir. 1981) (dictum); Gould v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 535
F.2d 761, 781 (3d Cir. 1976); Carras v. Burns, 516 F.2d 251, 259 (4th Cir. 1975); deHaas v.
Empire Petroleum Co., 435 F.2d 1223, 1229-32 (10th Cir. 1970); Green v. Wolf Corp., 406
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H. Fraud-on-the-Market as a Theory of Reliance in
Securities Cases Brought Under California Law
Mindful of the difficulties in proving reliance in securities-fraud
cases and Congress' expressed policy in promoting fair markets for
capital, the United States Supreme Court, in Basic, Inc. v. Levinson,10 2
ratified the fraud-on-the-market reliance presumption created in the
lower courts hearing these cases brought under Rule 10b-5.10 3 How-
ever, the federal courts were not the only courts presented with the
problems of proof created when attempting to apply the ill-suited tort
element of reliance in these unique fraud cases. English equity courts,
and later state trial courts, had previously encountered the problems
presented by the requirement of proving reliance in securities cases. 10 4
In the securities-fraud cases, these courts employed principles of
"market-reliance" to overcome the barriers of proof presented by the
traditional conception of "direct reliance." Against this historical
backdrop, the California Supreme Court in Mirkin v. Wasserman'05
was the first state high court to consider the question whether market-
reliance principles should apply in securities fraud class actions
brought under state law.
In Mirkin, plaintiffs, who bought securities at prices allegedly in-
flated as a result of misrepresentations, brought a class action for de-
ceit and negligent misrepresentation under the California Civil
Code 10 6 without alleging direct reliance.10 7 The trial court and the
F.2d 291,302-03 (2d. Cir. 1968), cert denied, 395 U.S. 977 (1969). In Green, the first Court
of Appeals to consider the issue decided that the 1934 Congress did not intend to import
punitive damages from the common law of deceit when it proscribed fraud in section 10(b).
Id. at 303. The Green court also pointed out that allowing punitive damages in Rule 10b-5
actions would not further policies in favor of exemplary remedies. Id The court identified
these policies as retribution and deterrence. Id In the case of corporate defendants, retri-
bution would not be served because the ultimate burden imposed by punitive damages
would fall on the shareholders, who would see their stock price fall as this occurred. Id
Nor would the purpose of deterrence be served, because the potential "crushing" liability
of actual damages and threat of criminal penalties already existed. Id. (citing 15 U.S.C.
§ 78ff).
102. 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
103. See supra notes 68-76 and accompanying text.
104. See infra Part III.A-B.
105. 858 P.2d 568 (Cal. 1993).
106. Id at 570. The plaintiffs brought their claims under California Civil Code sections
1709 and 1710. Section 1709 provides: "One who willfully deceives another with intent to
induce him to alter his position to his injury or risk, is liable for any damage which he
thereby suffers." CAL. CIV. CODE § 1709 (West 1985). Section 1710 defines deceit as
either:
1. The suggestion, as a fact, of that which is not true, by one who does not believe
it to be true;
2. The assertion, as a fact, of that which is not true, by one who has no reasonable
ground for believing it to be true;
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court of appeal sustained demurrers to the plaintiffs' complaint, which
had alleged that plaintiffs relied on the integrity of the market and
thus indirectly on the defendants' 10 8 misrepresentations in numerous
public documents. 0 9
The Supreme Court of California recognized plaintiffs' allega-
tions as requesting it to "incorporate the fraud-on-the-market theory
into the common law of deceit,"" 0 and in a 26-page opinion written
by Justice Panelli, rejected the plaintiffs' proposal."' The court based
its decision primarily on two conclusions: (1) pleading the fraud-on-
the-market theory in lieu of reliance would not be consistent with the
common law of deceit in California; and (2) there would be no justifi-
cation for changing the law in California to allow a presumption of
reliance in securities-fraud claims brought under the common law, and
doing so would involve altering policies best left to legislative
consideration."
2
A. The Mirkin Court's Analysis of the California Law of Deceit
In the beginning of its analysis, the court concluded that the Cali-
fornia law of deceit incorporates all the requirements of the common
law of deceit, including reliance.1 3 Thus, "California courts have al-
3. The suppression of a fact, by one who is bound to disclose it, or who gives
information of other facts which are likely to mislead for want of communication
of that fact; or,
4. A promise, made without any intention of performing it.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1710 (West 1985).
Negligent misrepresentation is defined as deceit under subdivision (2) of section 1710. The
court incorporated its discussion on negligent misrepresentation, stating its conclusions
would apply equally as well to negligent misrepresentation as they would to deceit.
Mirkin, 858 P.2d at 570 n.2.
107. Mirkin, 858 P.2d at 570-71. The facts of Mirkin are detailed supra in the
Introduction.
108. See supra note 24.
109. Mirkin, 858 P.2d at 570.
110. Id. at 571. The court noted two state court decisions rejecting such an application
of the fraud-on-the-market theory. Id. at 571 n.3 (citing Gaffin v. Teledyne, Inc., 611 A.2d
467, 474-75 (Del. 1992); Kahler v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 558 So.2d 144, 145 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1990)). However, the court also noted several federal court decisions on California
state law accepting such an application at the class certification stage. Id. (citing In re
Worlds of Wonder Sec. Litig., [1989-90 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 95,004,
at 95,628-29 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 23, 1990); In re ZZZZ Best Sec. Litig., [1989-90 Transfer
Binder) Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,485, at 93,087-88 (C.D. Cal. May 19, 1989); Wein-
berger v. Jackson, 102 F.R.D. 839, 846-47 (N.D. Cal. 1984)).
111. Id. at 584.
112. See infra Part II.B.
113. Mirkin, 858 P.2d at 572. The court cited California Civil Code section 5, which
provides that codifications of tort law are to be read consistently with the common law,
"'and not as new enactments."' Id. The court was responding to plaintiffs' argument that
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ways required plaintiffs in actions for deceit to plead and prove the
common law element of actual reliance."1 14
The court cast aside plaintiffs' argument that the Affiliated Ute
presumption 15 of reliance should apply to California deceit law be-
cause of the logical difficulty in proving reliance on an omission.116 In
Affiliated Ute, the United States Supreme Court ruled that in cases of
nondisclosure plaintiffs need not come forward with proof of reli-
ance.117 Plaintiffs sought the use of this presumption because coming
forward with proof that they relied on something they had never
heard would not be possible. The Mirkin court denied that proof in
such a case was not possible, stating that plaintiffs need only prove
they would have acted differently had they been notified of the omit-
ted information."18 The court reasoned that application of the Affili-
ated Ute presumption was not appropriate because it developed within
the body of law under Rule 10b-5, which "is not sufficiently analogous
to the law of fraud to justify its importation into the latter."" 19
The court next proceeded to reject plaintiffs' argument that two
California Supreme court decisions supported the proposition that a
plaintiff may plead a deceit claim in a securities-fraud case without
alleging actual reliance.120 In Vasquez v. Superior Court'2' and Occi-
California law did not require a showing of actual reliance because it was not expressly
required under the Civil Code. Id.
114. Id.
115. Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153 (1972); see supra notes
68-70 and accompanying text.
116. Mirkin, 858 P.2d at 573-74 & n.4.
117. 406 U.S. at 153; see supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
118. Mirkin, 858 P.2d at 574. In so doing, the court essentially ruled it would not shift
the burden of proof on the reliance issue. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit has well illustrated the effect of the Affiliated Ute presumption in shifting the bur-
den of proof:
Where a plaintiff alleges deception by [a] defendant's nondisclosure of material
information, the Ute presumption obviates the need for plaintiff to prove actual
reliance on the omitted information. Upon a failure of proof on the issue, de-
fendant loses. But this presumption of reliance in nondisclosure cases is not con-
clusive. If defendant can prove that plaintiff did not rely, that is, that plaintiff's
decision would not have been affected even if defendant had disclosed the omit-
ted facts, then plaintiff's recovery is barred.
Rifkin v. Crow, 574 F.2d 256, 262 (5th Cir. 1978).
119. Mirkin, 858 P.2d at 574. The court appended a footnote to its statement, which
explained its view that the Affiliated Ute presumption is, in certain instances, cumbersome
to apply. It identified two problems in applying the presumption. First, what are actually
misrepresentation cases may be pleaded as omissions cases. Id. at 574 n.4 (citing Gruber v.
Price Waterhouse, 776 F. Supp. 1044, 1050 (E.D. Pa. 1991)). Second, allocating the burden
of proof becomes difficult in cases involving both misrepresentations and omissions. Id.
(citing Cavalier Carpets, Inc. v. Caylor, 746 F.2d 749, 753-57 (11th Cir. 1984)).
120. Id. at 574-75.
121. 484 P.2d 964 (Cal. 1971).
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dental Land, Inc. v. Superior Court,122 the defendants made represen-
tations to each class member and plaintiffs pleaded actual reliance on
an individual basis.12 3 For example, in Vasquez, the plaintiffs alleged
that in reliance on misrepresentations made by defendant's salesmen,
they bought freezers and bulk frozen food on installment contracts.'
2 4
The defendant's salesmen memorized from their sales manual a stan-
dard sales pitch containing the representations and recited it by rote
to every plaintiff. 2 5 In Vasquez, the plaintiffs gained an "inference"
of reliance because their pleadings asserted that the defendant's sales-
men made uniform misrepresentations to each class member.126 The
Mirkin court distinguished the Vasquez and Occidental cases because
the Mirkin plaintiffs "never read or heard the alleged misrepresenta-
tions."127 Thus, according to the court, the Vasquez and Occidental
cases lent no support to the proposition that securities-fraud plaintiffs
are entitled to a presumption of reliance when their claims arise out of
purchases in an open market.,
In its final reply to the plaintiffs' arguments that pleading the
fraud-on-the-market theory in lieu of reliance would be consistent
with the current law of deceit in California, the court concluded that
indirect communication cases did not support incorporation of the
fraud-on-the-market theory into the California law of deceit.'l 8 The
court distinguished the indirect-communication cases from the situa-
tion of the Mirkin plaintiffs because a third party, and not the price of
a stock, delivered the misrepresentation in the indirect-communica-
tion cases.'2 9 The court also concluded that even in indirect-commu-
nication cases, plaintiffs must plead actual reliance, no matter how
indirectly they receive the false communication. 130 Addressing what
122. 556 P.2d 750 (Cal. 1976).
123. Mirkin, 858 P.2d at 574.
124. Vasquez, 484 P.2d at 966.
125. Id. at 971.
126. Id. at 972.
127. Mirkin, 858 P.2d at 574.
128. Id. at 574-78. The court may not have accurately characterized the assertions of
the plaintiffs. The court stated that, "according to plaintiffs, indirect communication"
would satisfy the pleading requirement. Id. at 575. The Petitioners' Reply Brief indicates
the indirect communication cases (Children's Television, in particular) were used, along
with Vasquez and Occidental, to illustrate the "reliance requirement could be relaxed, and
given a common sense meaning, in order to permit consumers (or investors) to pursue
important claims on a class basis." Petitioners' Reply Brief at 25, Mirkin (No. S020465).
Plaintiffs contended that the law should be applied flexibly, because fraud can be kaleido-
scopic in dimension, and because the "conceptual underpinnings" of these cases would "for
all practical purposes, actually approve of reasonable devices designed to ensure that vic-
tims of fraud receive relief." Id. at 26.
129. See id. at 576.
130. Id. at 576. To illustrate the principle, the court quoted RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS section 533:
[Vol. 46
FRAUD ON THE MARKET
appeared the most favorable precedent supporting plaintiffs' conten-
tions, the Mirkin court discussed at length 31 Committee on Children's
Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp.'3
2
In Children's Television, the California Supreme Court heard a
case brought against manufacturers of childrens' breakfast cereals.
Plaintiffs alleged in their complaint, inter alia, that defendants misrep-
resented in their commercials to the child audience that sugared cere-
als benefitted the childrens' health.133 The defendants argued that the
complaint did not adequately plead reliance by the parents, who
bought the cereal, because it was the children who received the al-
leged misrepresentations. 34 In response to this argument, the Chil-
dren's Television court stated:
Restatement Second of Torts section 533, states that '[t]he
maker of a fraudulent misrepresentation is subject to liability... to
another who acts in justifiable reliance upon it if the misrepresenta-
tion, although not made directly to the other, is made to a third
person and the maker intends or has reason to expect that its terms
The maker of a fraudulent misrepresentation is subject to liability for pecuni-
ary loss to another who acts in justifiable reliance upon it if the misrepresentation,
although not made directly to the other, is made to a third person and the maker
intends or has reason to expect that its terms will be repeated or its substance
communicated to the other, and that it will influence his conduct in the transac-
tion or type of transactions involved.
Mirkin, 858 P.2d at 575 (emphasis added).
The court then showed that cases both predating and following section 533 have applied
the same principles. Id. at 575-76. The court set out the facts of Varwig v. Anderson-Behel
Porsche/Audi, Inc., 141 Cal. Rptr. 539 (Ct. App. 1977), and Barnhouse v. City of Pinole,
183 Cal. Rptr. 881 (Ct. App. 1982), to demonstrate the principle that reliance must still be
shown when the plaintiff encounters the alleged misrepresentation indirectly. Id. at 576.
In Varwig.
The plaintiff.., purchased an automobile from a used car dealer who
claimed to have clear title. The claim proved to be erroneous when a lienholder
repossessed the car. Plaintiff sued both the seller and the seller's seller, who was
also an automobile dealer.... Based on the circumstances of the transaction
between the two dealers, which contemplated the car's eventual resale to a con-
sumer, the court found an implicit, and fraudulent, representation by the selling
dealer that the buying dealer was receiving a transferable title. Because it was
foreseeable that the buying dealer would repeat the misrepresentation, the court
held that the false claim of title was "in law an indirect misrepresentation to plain-
tiff, who purchased the car in reliance upon [the seller's] repetition of the
representation."
Mirkin, 858 P.2d at 576 (alteration in original) (quoting Varwig, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 541).
Thus, the Mirkin court distinguished Varwig and Barnhouse because the plaintiffs in those
cases "received the same misleading communications that the original purchasers had re-
ceived from the defendants." Id. at 576.
131. Mirkin, 858 P.2d at 577-78.
132. 673 P.2d 660 (Cal. 1983).
133. Id. at 664.
134. Id. at 674.
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will be repeated or its substance communicated to the other, and
that it will influence his conduct.' This proposition was [e]ndorsed
as California law in Varwig v. Anderson-Behel Porsche/Audi, Inc.
[141 Cal. Rptr. 539, 540 (1970)]. We recognize that it does not quite
cover the present case-plaintiffs do not allege the children re-
peated the representations to their parents, and we would imagine
that in most cases they did not, but simply expressed their desire for
the product. Repetition, however, should not be a prerequisite for
liability; it should be sufficient that defendant makes a misrepresen-
tation to one group intending to influence the behavior of the ulti-
mate purchaser, and that he succeeds in this plan.
135
The Mirkin court suggested that the Children's Television holding
"was based on the idea of an indirect misrepresentation."'1 36 How-
ever, the court would not construe as support for adoption of the
fraud-on-the-market theory the Childrens' Television rule that misrep-
resentations need not be repeated to the plaintiff when a "defendant
makes a misrepresentation to one group intending to influence the
behavior of the ultimate purchaser.' 37 Instead, the court opted for a
"narrower interpretation [of Children's Television] consistent with the
holding of the case."'138 According to the Mirkin court, the Children's
Television decision simply meant the plaintiffs in that case did not
need to precisely allege reliance because "'[c]hildren in particular are
unlikely to recall the specific advertisements which led them to desire
a product.""n 39 Therefore, the Mirkin court implicitly acknowledged
that the court in Children's Television relaxed the reliance require-
ment because of the practical difficulty for plaintiffs to allege the exact
communication relayed by the children to the parents. 140 The Chil-
dren's Television decision is authority for easing the reliance require-
ment in situations that make accurate pleading of actual reliance
impractical. Yet the court limited the Children's Television holding to
its own facts, and essentially refused to accept the fraud-on-the-mar-
ket theory as a form of indirect reliance. 141
135. Mirkin, 858 P.2d at 577 (quoting Children's Television, 673 P.2d at 674).
136. Id. at 578.
137. Id. at 577.
138. Id. at 578.
139. Id. (quoting Children's Television, 673 P.2d at 674).
140. Id.
141. A major premise in the fraud-on-the-market theory and the market reliance con-
cept, is that the price of stock may convey false information. See, e.g., Basic, Inc. v Levin-
son, 485 U.S. 224, 243-44 (1988); Peil v. Speiser, 806 F.2d 1154, 1161 (3d Cir. 1986)
("misrepresentations ... affect[ ] the price of the stock, and purchasers ... rely on the
price... as a reflection of its value"); Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 907 (9th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 816 (1976) (the price a stock purchaser pays for a manipulated stock
"reflects material misrepresentations"); In re LTV Sec. Litig., 88 F.R.D. 134, 143 (N.D. Tex.
1980) ("the market is interposed between seller and buyer and, ideally, transmits informa-
tion to the investor"); supra Part I. Therefore, it is clear that courts have not ended their
analysis because of the impersonal nature of the intermediary. Moreover, the reasoning
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Essentially, the only difference between the paradigm presented
in Children's Television and that of the Mirkin plaintiffs is the con-
veyer of the false information.1 42 In Children's Television the con-
veyer was a young child; in Mirkin it was the price of a stock. But the
central question in both cases was the same: Should a more lenient
standard of proving reliance be employed to determine whether the
defendants caused the transaction to occur, because the circumstances
made direct proof infeasible? The Mirkin court refused to apply a
lenient standard of reliance because the intermediary between the dis-
seminator of false information and plaintiffs was the price of a stock.
Curiously, the court's refusal to acknowledge that Children's Televi-
sion supported application of the fraud-on-the-market theory (or the
principle of market reliance) as a form of indirect reliance suggests it
believed that a four-year-old standing in a shopping cart pointing to a
box of sugared cereal more clearly conveys a false message about ce-
real nutrition than a manipulated price of stock conveys a false
message about its value.
B. The Mirkin Court's Analysis of Whether the Fraud-on-the-Market
Theory Should be Made California Law
In the remainder of its opinion, the Mirkin court discussed why it
should not change the California law of deceit to incorporate the
fraud-on-the-market theory.143 A central theme in the court's analysis
was that incorporating the fraud-on-the-market theory in certain se-
curities fraud cases brought under the common law of deceit would
skew the law in favor of investors, which would be inconsistent with
existing legislatively and judicially created policy choices. 144 The court
justified its conclusion, in part, by showing there was no special need
for a remedy on behalf of the plaintiffs, who had already filed claims
in federal court under Rule lOb-5.145
and language of the courts in most of these cases suggests that the fraud-on-the-market
theory and the market reliance concept are within the genre of indirect reliance cases. See,
eg., Basic, 485 U.S. at 241-42 ("Misleading statements.., defraud purchasers of stock even
if the purchasers do not directly rely on the misstatements."); Blackie, 524 F.2d at 908 (the
"causal nexus can be adequately established indirectly, by proof of materiality coupled
with the [fact that] a stock purchaser does not seek to purchase a loss .... ); LTV, 88
F.R.D. at 143; Christopher Boffey, Mirkin v. Wasserman: The Supreme Court of California
Rejects the Fraud-on-the-Market Theory in State Law Deceit Actions, 49 Bus. LAW. 715,
734-35 (1994) (asserting that Mirkin court incorrectly applied California indirect communi-
cation cases); infra Part II.B-C.
142. Dissenting, Justice Kennard argued that this distinction should have no effect on
applying principles of indirect reliance in this case. See infra Part II.C.
143. Mirkin, 858 P.2d at 579-84.
144. Id. at 584.
145. Id. at 580 (citing Zucker v. Maxicare Health Plans, Inc., No. CV-88-02499 (C.D.
Cal. 1993)). The court pointed out that a private right of action existed under Rule 10b-5
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In its discussion, the court expressed its concern regarding the
policy implications that would result from creating a cause of action
relaxing the reliance requirement in a common-law claim of deceit
while retaining the obvious advantages the common-law claim would
provide. First, a three-year discovery rule governs the statute of limi-
tations in a cause of action for deceit. 146 The statute of limitations
under the Corporations Code is one year after discovery or four years
after the malefaction. 147 The court noted that the "shorter limitations
period in the Corporations Code was specifically intended to counter-
balance the tremendous advantage that a presumption of reliance af-
fords to plaintiffs.' 4
8
Second, the court believed that such a cause of action retaining
the punitive damages measure would be antithetical to established
and that investors could be afforded the presumption of reliance requested by pleading a
fraud-on-the-market theory in federal court. Id. at 579 (citing Basic, 485 U.S. at 241-47).
The court noted that plaintiffs might also have a cause of action under California Cor-
porations Code section 25400, but would not venture to explain how. Id at 580. Section
25400(d) makes it unlawful for one who is buying or selling securities to misrepresent or
omit any material fact in order to induce the purchase or sale of the security. CAL. CORP.
CODE § 25400(d) (West 1977). The main difference between the private cause of action
under the California Corporations Code and under Rule 10b-5, though, is that under Cali-
fornia law the defendant must have transacted in the particular security at the time of the
alleged misrepresentations or omissions. Compare CAL. CORP. CODE § 25400(d) (defend-
ant must be "selling or offering for sale or purchasing or offering to purchase" the security)
with Rule 10b-5, supra note 51 (the alleged fraud need only be "in connection with" the
sale or purchase of securities, Le., the plaintiff must have bought or sold to have standing,
but not the defendant). As Justice Kennard pointed out in her dissenting opinion, the
plaintiffs likely would not have a cause of action under section 25400, because "when a
corporation sells its stock through underwriters ... the corporation and its officers are not
sellers and therefore are not bound by section 25400(d)." Mirkin, 858 P.2d at 594 (citing In
re Activision Sec. Litig., 621 F. Supp. 415, 422 (N.D. Cal. 1985)).
146. Mirkin, 858 P.2d at 582. California Code of Civil Procedure section 338 provides a
statute of limitations:
Within three years:
(a) An action upon a liability created by statute, other than a penalty or
forfeiture
(d) An action for relief on the ground of fraud or mistake. The cause of
action in that case is not to be deemed to have accrued until the discovery, by the
aggrieved party, of the facts constituting the fraud or mistake.
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 338(a), (d) (West Supp. 1995).
147. Mirkin, 858 P.2d at 582. California Corporations Code section 25506 provides:
No action shall be maintained to enforce any liability created under Section
25500... unless brought before the expiration of four years after the act or trans-
action constituting the violation or the expiration of one year after the discovery
by the plaintiff of the facts constituting the violation, whichever shall first expire.
CAL. CORP. CODE § 25506 (West Supp. 1995).
148. Mirkin, 858 P.2d at 582 (citing Bowden v. Robinson, 136 Cal. Rptr. 871, 878
(1977)).
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legislative policy and case law.149 Punitive damages are rarely justified
in securities litigation because the additional measure of deterrence
and retribution gained outweighs the burden put upon business.150 As
the court noted, in a securities-fraud case actual damages alone can
impose draconian liability.151 The court also pointed out that the se-
curities class action provides sufficient deterrent value; since numer-
ous small claims are not lost because of the ability to join each claim,
the damages in total are a significant deterrent. 52
Lastly, the court recognized that requirements uniquely suited to
securities litigation have evolved in the federal courts as a result of
Rule 10b-5 litigation; however, the same has not occurred in the law
of deceit.' 53 The most remarkable of these limitations are the limita-
tion of standing established by Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores'54 and the scienter requirement of Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder 55 In Blue Chip Stamps, the United States Supreme
Court held that plaintiffs employing a fraud-on-the-market theory of
reliance must have bought or sold the security at issue.' 56 In
Hochfelder, the Supreme Court established scienter, and not mere
negligence, as the degree of culpability required in a Rule 10b-5
case.' 57 The Mirkin court stated:
These requirements of actions under Rule 10b-5, like the relatively
short limitations period and the ban on punitive damages, reflect a
deliberate effort, guided by judicial experience with securities fraud
cases, to balance the advantages associated with a presumption of
reliance against the danger of speculative and harassing claims.' 58
Therefore, according to the Mirkin court, these same limitations could
not be read into the common law.
The court concluded that any benefit derived from incorporation
of the fraud-on-the-market theory into the common law of deceit
would be outweighed by the fact the common law of deceit is ill
equipped to deal with the nature of securities litigation.' 59 In the view
149. Ld. at 582-83.
150. Id. The court cited several federal cases considering the question: Carras v.
Bums, 516 F.2d 251, 260 (4th Cir. 1975); Baumel v. Rosen, 412 F.2d 571, 576 (4th Cir.
1969); Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291, 303 & n.18 (2d Cir. 1968); Diaz Vicente v.
Obenauer, 736 F. Supp. 679, 695 (E.D. Va. 1990).
151. Mirkin, 858 P.2d at 583 (citing Green, 406 F.2d at 303 & n.18).
152. Id.
153. Id. at 583-84.
154. 421 U.S. 723, 730-55 (1975).
155. 425 U.S. 185, 194-215 (1976).
156. Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 749.
157. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 194-215.
158. Mirkin v. Wasserman, 858 P.2d 568,584 (Cal. 1993) (citing Blue Chip Stamps, 421
U.S. at 738-49; Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 214 & n.33).
159. Id.
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of the Mirkin court, allowing a presumption of reliance in these cir-
cumstances would "open the door [in California] to class action law-
suits based on exceedingly speculative theories," and there was no
justification for doing SO.1
6 0
C. The Dissenting Opinion in Mirkin
Justice Kennard dissented from the opinion of the court.161 She
argued that pleading a fraud-on-the-market theory was tantamount to
alleging a theory based on indirect reliance-a paradigm settled in
California common law and recognized in section 533 of the Second
Restatement of Torts.162 The foundation of the analogy was that a
misrepresentation might injure a plaintiff even though the misrepre-
sentation, whether in the same form or not, reached the plaintiff
merely indirectly. 163 Furthermore, stated Justice Kennard, "the mis-
representation remains actionable even though the intermediary has
paraphrased or summarized it, or even transformed it from an asser-
tion of fact into a rating, certification, or recommendation.''
16
To prove and illustrate the argument, Justice Kennard cited com-
ment f of section 533.165 In comment f, the malefactor misrepresents
facts to a credit rating company for the purpose of obtaining a
favorable credit rating:
In this case the maker is subject to liability to any person who may
be expected to and does extend credit to him in reliance upon the
erroneous rating so procured. The fact that the rating company does
not communicate the figures misstated by the maker of the misrepre-
sentations is immaterial It is enough that their substance is summa-
rized with reasonable accuracy or that the rating given expresses the
effect of the misstatements made. 1
66
Justice Kennard attempted to bridge the logical gap between the indi-
rect reliance cases discussed and the arena of securities fraud by char-
acterizing the "price setting mechanism" of the developed securities
market as the "intermediary" conveying the fraudulent informa-
tion.167 As further proof that the fraud-on-the-market theory was
analogous to the principle of indirect reliance, Justice Kennard quoted
160. Id.
161. Id. at 584-95 (Kennard, J., concurring and dissenting).
162. Id. at 586-88, 595.
163. Id. at 586.
164. Id. at 586-87 (citing Learet Corp. v. Spenlinhauer, 901 F.2d 198, 200-02 (1st Cir.
1990); American Trust Co. v. California W. States Life Ins. Co., 98 P.2d 497, 509 (Cal.
1940); Crystal Pier Amusement Co. v. Cannan, 25 P.2d 839, 841 (Cal. 1933); Hunter v.
McKenzie, 239 P. 1090, 1094 (Cal. 1925).
165. Id. at 587.
166. Id. (emphasis in Justice Kennard's opinion) (citing RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF
ToRTS § 533 cmt. f (1977)).
167. Id. at 588.
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Blackie v. Barrack168 in which the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
strongly implied it was relying on principles of indirect reliance in es-
tablishing the fraud-on-the-market theory concept.' 69 She concluded
by stating that the presumption of reliance employed in the fraud-on-
the-market theory was merely rhetoric describing the fact that "one
who has purchased a security at an artificially inflated price, believing
that the price-setting mechanism is untainted, has indirectly relied on
the public misrepresentations that caused the price distortion.'
70 Jus-
tice Kennard viewed the fraud-on-the-market theory as not analyti-
cally distinct from other forms of indirect reliance.
17'
I. Market Reliance Concepts in the Common Law of
Deceit
Much of the opinion of the court in Mirkin discussed whether the
fraud-on-the-market theory was analogous to the California law of in-
direct misrepresentation. 72 Conspicuously omitted, however, is any
discussion of common-law securities-fraud cases. Indeed, based on a
reading of Mirkin, one would expect that there was no common-law
remedy for victims of securities fraud committed on the open market,
especially in California. However, as the federal judges of the last
twenty years recognized and dealt with the barriers to proof of actual
reliance in cases for securities fraud, so too did common-law judges
recognize and pierce through those barriers in rooting out fraud.
173
168. 524 F.2d 891 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 816 (1976); see supra notes 72-
76 and accompanying text.
169. Mirkin, 858 P.2d at 589 (Kennard, J., concurring and dissenting). Justice Kennard
quoted the following:
A purchaser on the stock exchanges may be either unaware of a specific false
representation, or may not directly rely on it .... Nevertheless, he relies gener-
ally on the supposition that the market price is validly set... and thus indirectly
on the truth of the representations underlying the stock price-whether he is aware
of it or no4 the price he pays reflects material misrepresentations. Requiring direct
proof from each purchaser that he relied on a particular representation when
purchasing would defeat recovery by those whose reliance was indirect ....
Id. (emphasis in Justice Kennard's opinion) (quoting Blackie, 524 F.2d at 907).
170. Id. at 593.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 575-78 (opinion of the court). For discussion of this portion of the opinion,
see supra notes 12842 and accompanying text.
173. In their time, the common-law judges identified the unique manners in which
fraud occurred and sought to apply the law to their case. As a general proposition, these
judges applied the rules flexibly, so that fraud-feasors could not avoid the law. For exam-
ple, in drawing the principles of fraud to a case in which the defendant was selling goods in
the market under the name of another, Lord Macnaghten eloquently wrote:
[Fraud is infinite in variety; sometimes it is audacious and unblushing; sometimes
it pays a sort of homage to virtue, and then it is modest and retiring; it would be
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As a result, in many cases brought under common law, courts did not
require direct proof of actual reliance.
As early as 1814, the English common-law judges applied market-
reliance principles in securities cases involving fraud on the open mar-
ket.' 74 American jurisdictions incorporated this line of decisions into
their common law and followed them, even when the English common
law entered a brief state of flux. California recognized these decisions
when it incorporated the common law of deceit in 1872.175 California
judges were well aware of market reliance principles, as an examina-
tion of appellate decisions antedating the federal securities laws
reveals. Later, California courts applied these principles in cases aris-
ing out of fraud committed on the open market in the issuance of
securities. 1
76
A. Origins of Indirect Reliance in the Early Common Law of Deceit
In the early common law of deceit, courts often did not specifi-
cally look to whether a plaintiff relied on a misrepresentation, but in-
stead focused their inquiry on the nature of the fraud committed and
whether the plaintiff was injured. Although not specifically expli-
cated, this inquiry encompassed issues of reliance. 177 Then, as now in
fraud-on-the-market cases, courts inferred reliance by the inducement
of the market price or other false device, not the misrepresentation
preceding it.
In many actions brought under the common law of deceit, direct
proof of reliance was not required. For example, William Blackstone
recognized that the typical action for deceit in his day involved reli-
ance not of the plaintiff who was injured, but of some other third
party-such as a court: "as if one brings an action in another's name,
and then suffers a nonsuit, whereby the plaintiff becomes liable to
costs: or where one suffers a fraudulent recovery of land or chattels to
the prejudice of him that hath right."'1 78 Deceit encompassed any ac-
tion for damages where a defendant practiced a misrepresentation or
honesty itself if it could only afford it. But fraud is fraud all the same; and it is the
fraud, not the manner of it, which calls for the interposition of the Court.
Reddaway v. Banham, [1896] 1 App. Cas. 199, 221 (appeal taken from Eng.) (emphasis
added). As stated by one American judge:
Fraud being infinite and taking on protean form at will, were courts to cramp
themselves by defining it with a hard and fast definition, their jurisdiction would
be cunningly circumvented at once by new schemes beyond the definition.
Stonemets v. Head, 154 S.W. 108, 114 (Mo. 1913).
174. See The King v. De Berenger, 105 Eng. Rep. 536, 539-40 (K.B. 1814).
175. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 5 (West 1982).
176. See infra Part III.D.
177. See infra Part III.B.
178. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *166.
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dishonesty, and the plaintiff was "deceived or injured" as a conse-
quence.179 In Blackstone's time, other actions for deceit included suits
for the use of false dice or other rigged odds in games of chance.180
As would be expected, these cases did not involve statements made
directly to the plaintiff.'81
Lord John Comyns, an influential commentator of the time,
explained:
An action on the case for a deceipt lies, when a man does any
deceipt to the damage of another. As, if a man play with false dice,
and thereby win the money of another. Tho' he do not intice the
other to play; for the inticement is not the cause of the action, but the
using false dice. 182
The reasoning identified by Lord Comyns later became the rationale
for the holding in Pasley v. Freeman,183 which is recognized as the
leading case for deceit in tort law.' 84 More importantly, this same ra-
tionale was echoed by Justice Blackmun in reasoning the premise of
the fraud-on-the-market theory, two centuries later in Basic, Inc. v.
Levinson:
It has been noted that "it is hard to imagine that there ever is a
buyer or seller who does not rely on market integrity. Who would
knowingly roll the dice in a crooked crap game?51
85
In the times of the early common law, as now, it was recognized that
in certain instances a cause of action for deceit or fraud would lie
when the defendant's misrepresentation had some connection with
the plaintiff's injury, even if the plaintiff could not produce direct
proof of reliance on the misrepresentation. 8 6
179. 3 id.
180. See, e.g., 1 J. CoMYNS, A DIGEST OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 346 (5th ed. 1822).
181. 1 id.
182. 1 i. (emphasis added).
183. 100 Eng. Rep. 450, 457 (K.B. 1789).
184. The action for deceit was not clearly a tort or contract action, but apparently a
hybrid of the two, from the time deceit was originated in the thirteenth century until the
late eighteenth century. See WILLIAM L. PROSSER ET AL., CASES & MATERIALS ON TORTS
1024-25 (8th ed. 1988). Pasley marked the beginning of deceit as "purely a tort action." Id.
Prosser described the case as the "parent" of our modem law of deceit and misrepresenta-
tion. KEETON Er AL., supra note 56, § 105, at 728; see also Fischer v. Kletz, 266 F. Supp.
180, 187 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) ("American courts have consistently followed and elaborated
upon this holding").
185. Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 246-47 (1988) (quoting Schlanger v. Four-
Phase Systems, Inc., 555 F. Supp. 535, 538 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (emphasis added)).
186. The early common-law decisions held as elements for the deceit action (1) a deceit
practiced by the defendant and (2) a connected injury in the plaintiff. See Pasley, 100 Eng.
Rep. at 456. The modem deceit law elements of causation and reliance evolved from the
second element of this cause of action. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 56, § 105, at 728.
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B. Concepts of Market Reliance in the Common Law
Common-law judges began to develop a law of market manipula-
tion and market fraud long before the promulgation of Rule 10b-5 and
the formal espousal of the fraud-on-the-market theory and modem
economic concepts. In their time, as now, the fact that the plaintiff
transacted in a dishonest or sham market, not the misrepresentation
creating the market, provided the cause of action. In both times it was
understood that investors ought to expect the stock market to be free
of manipulation.
As early as the beginning of the 19th century, common-law judges
recognized that manipulation of securities markets establishes an ac-
tion for fraud. In 1814, the court in The King v. De Berenger 87 recog-
nized that false rumors affect the market price at which securities
trade to the detriment of all those purchasing them at the fraudulent
price. In De Berenger, the defendants were charged with inflating the
market price of government securities by spreading false rumors that
Napoleon had died, and that the war with France was about to end.188
The court, through Lord Ellenborough, stated:
[T]he conspiracy is by false rumors to raise the price of the public
funds and securities .... The purpose itself is mischievous. It
strikes at the price of a vendible commodity in the market, and, if it
gives it a fictitious price by means of false rumors, it is a fraud leveled
against all the public, for it is against all such as may possibly have
any thing to do with the funds on that particular day.189
The court went on to state that regardless of when the rumor was
spread, the defendant would be liable to "all those who should be-
come purchasers" at the time the market was affected if the rumor
were designed to affect the market.190 While De Berenger was a crimi-
nal case, 20 years later the court in a civil case, Stainbank v. Fernley,191
upheld a complaint alleging, in substance, a "fraud on the market."
The complaint in Stainbank recounted the actions of the directors
of the Northern and Central Bank of England, who had caused the
company to issue positive reports regarding its business and profitabil-
ity, and to declare dividends in order to give the illusion that the com-
pany was profitable.192 The plaintiff charged that the report was false,
and was issued "to raise the price of shares in the market."'1 93 The
187. 105 Eng. Rep. 536 (K.B. 1814).
188. Id. at 536-37.
189. Id. at 538 (emphasis added); see also McMullen v. Hoffman, 174 U.S. 639, 649
(1899); United States v. Brown, 5 F. Supp. 81, 85-86 (S.D.N.Y. 1933), affd, 79 F.2d 321 (2d
Cir. 1935), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 650 (1936).
190. Id. at 539.
191. 59 Eng. Rep. 473 (V.C. 1839).
192. Id. at 473-74.
193. Id. at 476.
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court explained the complaint as alleging that the misrepresentations
were made in order to induce the public to purchase shares at a price
not reflecting their true value.' 94 The defendant demurred, stating
there had been no allegation "that any communication passed be-
tween the Plaintiff and [him], at the time of the sale."' 95 Not im-
pressed by this fact, the court ,overruled the demurrer because the
defendant had participated in the scheme to inflate the market price
of the securities.1
96
Bedford v. Bagshaw'97 is probably the most popularly cited early
common-law decision employing market reliance principles. In Bed-
ford the officers and directors of the Lake Bathurst Australian Gold
Mining Company made misrepresentations to the Stock Exchange of
London in order to procure the listing of their company's securities. 198
In reliance on the company's representations, the stock exchange
listed the stock and established a settling day for transactions in its
securities. 99 "Relying on the quotation in the official list" of the
stock exchange, the plaintiff purchased 200 shares of stock which later
turned out to be valueless. 200 The court recognized that the plaintiff
made the purchase trusting that the stock's listing was accurate, and
awarded damages in the action for fraud and deceit.20' There was no
allegation of direct reliance on any of the defendants' statements.
On appeal, the court rejected an argument that fraud had not
been established because "[a]l persons buying shares on the Stock
Exchange must be considered as persons to whom it was contem-
plated that the representation would be made. '202 The court held that
an action for deceit would lie whenever a company director through
misrepresentations "procures an artificial and false value to be given
to the shares in the Company. '20 3 On the issue of reliance (or induce-
ment), the court said it did not matter that the false representations
never came to the attention of the plaintiff, so long as he "was one of
the persons to whom he contemplated that the representation should
be made, or a person whom the defendant ought to have been aware
he was injuring or might injure. '204 Thus, so long as the defendants
194. Id.
195. Id. at 474.
196. Id. at 476-77.
197. 157 Eng. Rep. 951 (Ex. 1859).
198. Id. at 951-52.
199. Id.
200. I&
201. Id. at 954.
202. Id. at 956.
203. Id.
204. I& at 956.
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manipulated the stock, they would be liable to anyone who might
purchase it.
C. Incorporation of Market-Reliance Principles into American Common
Law
Bedford was well established in 1872,205 and the principles it laid
down were substantially codified by the California Legislature when it
adopted the common law in enacting its Civil Code at that time.2° 6
Moreover, the American courts carried on these principles of market
reliance in securities-fraud cases following the Bedford decision,20 7
even though English courts later abandoned the lenient Bedford prin-
ciples in favor of strict limitations on fraud remedies.20 8 American
courts have generally not followed these English decisions, which
eventually lost their foothold in English law as well.209 Furthermore,
it is Bedford's principles that developed in American law prior to en-
205. Citing Bedford, the American edition of the leading treatise on fraud and deceit
explained:
The right to bring an action of deceit at law, or have relief in equity, on the
ground of misrepresentation, is not confined to the person to whom the false
representation has been made, but extends to third persons, provided it appear
that the representation was made with the intent that it would be acted on by such
third persons, or by the class of persons to whom they may be supposed to be-
long, in the manner that occasions the loss or injury.
WILLIAM WILLIAMSON KERR, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF FRAUD AND MISTAKE 373
(ann. Am. ed. 1872).
Compare this with California Civil Code section 1711, which states: "One who prac-
tices a deceit with intent to defraud the public, or a particular class of persons, is deemed to
have intended to defraud every individual in that class, who is actually misled by the de-
ceit." CAL. CIV. CODE § 1711 (West 1985).
206. California Civil Code section 5 provides that codifications of tort common law are
to be read consistently with the common law, "and not as new enactments." CAL. CIV.
CODE § 5 (West 1982); see also Mirkin v. Wasserman, 858 P.2d 568, 572 (Cal. 1993).
207. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 5 F. Supp. 81, 86-87 (S.D.N.Y. 1933) (following
Bedford); Ottinger v. Bennett, 129 N.Y.S. 819, 821 (App. Div.) (same) (Miller, J., dissent-
ing), rev'd adopting dissenting opinion below, 96 N.E. 1123 (N.Y. 1911).
208. In England, after 1872, Bedford was overruled by dictum in the case of Peek v.
Gurney, 6 L.R.-E. & I. App. (H.L. 1873) (appeal taken from England). Gurney was the
beginning of a line of English cases in which strict limitations were imposed on the reme-
dies for fraud in the late nineteenth century. See, e.g., Derry v. Peek, [1889] 14 App. Cas.
337 (H.L.) (appeal taken from England).
209. Because these cases, specifically Derry, severely narrowed the remedies for fraud,
it was given a "guarded reception in the United States." GEORGE C. CHRISTIE, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF TORTS 885 (1st ed. 1983). For example, the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals regarded it as one more expression of "a 19th Century English Court's
reluctance to believe ill of the tycoons of its day." Rosenberg v. Hano, 121 F.2d 818, 819
(3d Cir. 1941). For proof that the restrictive Derry view of fraud did not take hold in the
United States, see Barnhouse v. City of Pinole, 183 Cal. Rptr. 881, 894 (Ct. App. 1982);
Varwig v. Anderson-Behel Porsche/Audi, 141 Cal. Rptr. 539, 541 (Ct. App. 1977); Bunge
Corp. v. GATX Corp., 557 So.2d 1376, 1383 (La. 1990).
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actment of the federal securities laws. 210 By the time the federal se-
curities laws were passed by Congress in 1933 and 1934, it was
recognized that "the law had developed to a point where a false repre-
sentation made with the intent of affecting the market price was held
to give rise to a action for anyone purchasing a security in the open
market.1211 Thereafter, securities-fraud litigation shifted to the fed-
eral courts, where common law market reliance principles were
reinvented under the modem name "fraud-on-the-market."
212
A brief survey of some American decisions demonstrates the
existence of market-reliance principles as they developed in the
United States. In McElroy v. Harnack, plaintiffs alleged that they
were defrauded when they purchased bonds on the Pittsburgh Stock
Exchange, because defendants were selling and purchasing the bonds
to inflate the price.213 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the
lower court's judgment entered in favor of the plaintiffs, stating:
Harnack and Gartner were members of the Pittsburg [sic]
Stock Exchange and, of course, were familiar with its daily transac-
tions. They, therefore, knew of each day's sales and purchases of
the [subject] corporation bonds made by themselves and the other
defendants and the fictitious and highly inflated values which their
action gave the bonds.... They issued the bonds, put them on the
market at the stock exchange and sold, as well as purchased, some
at par which they knew to be more than thirty times their real value.
In doing so, they gave the bonds a value which they knew they did
not possess and their action was a fraud on innocent purchasers and
others who were induced to accept the bonds at their inflated values.
... It was the fictitious values given the bonds by the precon-
certed action of the four defendants which injured the plaintiffs and
constitutes the tort for which the action was brought.
214
Five years later, in Ottinger v. Bennett, the plaintiffs alleged that
they were defrauded when the American Ice Company declared a div-
idend and plaintiffs subsequently purchased the stock, which later be-
came nearly valueless after it was disclosed that the company was
Modem English law treatises indicate that the strictures imposed by Derry have been
heavily relaxed in recent times. See, eg., R.F.V. HEUSTON & R.A. BucKLEY, SALMOND &
HEUSTON ON THE LAW OF TORTs 387-91 (20th ed. 1992).
210. See, eg., Willcox v. Harriman Sec. Corp., 10 F. Supp. 532, 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1933);
Brown, 5 F. Supp. at 87; Ottinger, 96 N.E. at 1123; A.A. Berle, Jr., Liability For Stock
Market Manipulation, 31 COLuM. L. REv. 264,269 n.9 (1931) [hereinafter Berle, Liability].
211. A.A. Berle, Jr., Stock Market Manipulation, 38 CoLUM. L. REv. 393, 395 (1938)
[hereinafter Berle, Market Manipulation].
212. There has been no study on exactly why the litigation shifted to the federal courts.
Presumably, plaintiffs sought the more liberal pleading and discovery standards in federal
courts, and defendants desired the independence of federal judges.
213. 63 A. 127, 128 (Pa. 1906).
214. Id. at 129 (emphasis added) (author's correction).
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actually in financial ruin.215 The theory of the plaintiffs was that the
directors of the company committed fraud by declaring a dividend,
because in so doing they implicitly represented that the company's
operations were profitable.216 The New York Court of Appeals re-
versed the decision of the lower appellate court, which had found that
there was no fraud because the plaintiff had not pleaded reasonable
reliance on the defendants' representation.217 The high court explic-
itly adopted the dissenting opinion in the appellate court below of
Judge Miller, who stated:
We have had many illustrations in cases before us of the devices to
deceive the public employed by managing directors who misuse
their positions to promote stock speculation, and the payment of
dividends out of capital is a familiar one. When that is done to in-
duce the public to purchase shares of the company and thereby to
create a fictitious value, upon which the wrongdoers may trade, they
should be held accountable precisely as though the like deception had
been practiced by actual misstatements.
218
Judge Miller analogized Bedford to the facts of the case, and described
the Bedford decision as a "settled principle[ ] of law.1219
In Blewett v. Ward, it was alleged that the defendants fraudulently
inflated the price of securities on the Spokane Stock Exchange. 220
The court stated that a plaintiff relying on the integrity of the market
price in the official sheets of the stock exchange in purchasing the
securities would be defrauded if the defendants "manipulated the sale
of the stock upon the Spokane Stock Exchange in the manner found,
and used the daily sheets of the exchange to induce the respondent to
purchase the stock."'22' In federal courts, judges recognized similar
market manipulation scenarios as defrauding investors.222 For exam-
ple, the court in Willcox v. Harriman Securities Corp. was applying
principles of market reliance when it stated:
If persons boost the quoted price of a stock above its real value by
fictitious sales in order to induce the public to take over their stock
at the artificial levels, one who acquires stock for value from the
manipulators may treat the transaction as one infected by fraud....
The fact that information as to the sales at artificial figures comes to
the victims by reports or quotations published in the newspapers
215. 129 N.Y.S. 819, 821 (App. Div.), rev'd, 96 N.E. 1123 (N.Y. 1911).
216. Id. at 821-22.
217. Ottinger v. Bennett, 96 N.E. 1123, 1124 (N.Y. 1911).
218. 129 N.Y.S. at 825-26 (emphasis added).
219. Id. at 826.
220. 294 P. 577, 578 (Wash. 1930).
221. Id. at 578; see also Harris v. United States, 48 F.2d 771, 774-75 (9th Cir. 1931).
222. See, e.g., Goess v. Lucinda Shops, Inc., 93 F.2d 449,452-55 (2d Cir. 1937) (Manton,
J., dissenting) (discussing market manipulation and common-law market reliance princi-
ples); Willcox v. Harriman Sec. Corp., 10 F. Supp. 532,535 (S.D.N.Y. 1933) (same); United
States v. Brown, 5 F. Supp. 81, 86-87 (S.D.N.Y. 1933) (same).
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rather than by direct communications from the manipulators does not
break the chain of causation.
223
D. Market Reliance Principles in California Law
California courts, too, recognized that securities markets could be
manipulated to the injury of those purchasing securities at inflated
prices. Like the court in Ottinger, the California Court of Appeal in
1930 recognized that companies could declare dividends to manipu-
late the public market for their securities, in stating: "the publication
of a statement that a corporation will, at a stated future time, declare a
large dividend is accepted by the buying public as a statement of a fact
and results in a great increase in sales of the corporation's capital
stock."224 And in Bacciocco v. Transamerica Corporation,225 a Cali-
fornia Court of Appeal recognized that an agreement to manipulate
the price of Transamerica Corporation's securities in order "to lead
the public to buy shares of the Transamerica Corporation at a ficti-
tious and unfair price" had involved the conspirators in "a fraud upon
the public generally.
'226
Furthermore, California courts recognize a version of the fraud-
on-the-market theory often termed the "fraud on the regulatory pro-
cess." 227 The California Supreme Court stated the theory as follows:
Whenever... an issuer or underwriter of securities offers them
for sale to the public, he impliedly represents that the applicable
provisions of law have been complied with. The falsity of that rep-
resentation may give rise to an action either for breach of warranty
or for fraud depending upon the culpability of the seller in the par-
ticular transaction.228
Although the cause of action can sound in warranty (a contractual
basis for liability), when such a seller knows that the stock in question
is not authorized for sale, there is a fraud made upon any purchaser.229
Thus, under California law, the issuance of stock is a representation of
legality upon which its purchasers may rely. The similarity between
this and the fraud-on-the-market theory is clear. Investors rely not
223. 10 F. Supp. at 535 (emphasis added).
224. H.W. Smith, Inc. v. Swenson, 286 P. 1050, 1052 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1930).
225. 38 P.2d 417 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1934).
226. Ld. at 417.
227. See Mary Pickford Co. v. Bayly Bros., Inc., *86 P.2d 102, 111 (Cal. 1939); Green v.
Caribou Oil Mining Co., 178 P. 950, 952 (Cal. 1919); Universal By-Prods., Inc. v. City of
Modesto, 117 Cal. Rptr. 525, 529 (Ct. App. 1974); see also Woods v. Deck, 112 F.2d 739,
741,743 (9th Cir. 1940); Taormina v. Antelope Mining Corp., 242 P.2d 665, 668 (Cal. 1952);
Bowden v. Robinson, 136 Cal. Rptr. 871;879 n.1 (Ct. App. 1977) (dictum); Smith v. Turner,
47 Cal. Rptr. 582, 591 (Ct. App. 1965); 37 AM. JUR. 2D Fraud & Deceit § 42, at 67 (1968).
228. Mary Pickford Co., 86 P.2d at 111.
229. Id (quoting 5 SAMUEL WILLISTON & WALTER H.E. JAEGER, A TREATISE ON THE
LAW OF CoNTRAcTs § 1505, at 4198 (2d. ed. 1936)).
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only "generally on the supposition that the market price is validly set
and that no unsuspected manipulation has artificially inflated the
price, '230 but also on the supposition that the stock they purchase is
legally authorized for sale. Like the plaintiff in a fraud-on-the-market
case, who alleges reliance "indirectly on the truth of the representa-
tions underlying the stock price,"' 231 the plaintiff in a fraud-on-the-reg-
ulatory-process case alleges reliance "indirectly" on the
representation that the stock is authorized for sale. Then federal
judge, now Chief Justice Lucas of the California Supreme Court
wrote:
Just as the open market purchaser relies on the integrity of the mar-
ket and the price of the security traded on the open market to re-
flect the true value of securities in which he invests, so the purchaser
of an original issue security relies, at least indirectly, on the integrity
of the regulatory process and the truth of any representation made
to the appropriate agencies and the investors at the time of the orig-
inal issue.
23
The Court of Appeal in Mirkin addressed this issue in a cursory man-
ner, simply noting that it was not dealing with an original issue case.2
33
However, the court did not explain why investors should rely on the
integrity of the regulatory process but not on the integrity of the open
market.
E. Summary
By 1934, commentators recognized:
American cases seemed to establish the propositions that false rep-
resentations in connection with the sale of a security were actiona-
ble . . . and that the wrongdoer was liable to any member of the
public who might be injured thereby, regardless of whether the false
representations were made directly to the injured buyer.
254
America's leading authority on the law of corporations and securities
fraud, Professor A.A. Berle,235 wrote that dissemination of false infor-
mation with the intent of affecting the price of a security would give
230. Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 907 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 816
(1976) (explaining basis for fraud-on-the-market theory of reliance).
231. 524 F.2d at 907.
232. Arthur Young & Co. v. United States Dist. Court, 549 F.2d 686, 695 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977); see In re Fortune Sys. Sec. Litig., 680 F. Supp. 1360, 1372
(N.D. Cal. 1987). Chief Justice Lucas did not take part in the Mirkin decision.
233. Mirkin v. Wasserman, 278 Cal. Rptr. 729, 736 (Ct. App. 1991).
234. Paul L. Porterfield, Comment, Securities: Stock Market Manipulation at Common
Law and Under Recent Federal Securities Legislation, 28 CAL. L. REV. 378, 380 (1940)
(emphasis added).
235. Professor Berle's CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF CORPORATION Fi-
NANCE (1930) was a leading law school textbook on corporate finance. His book with
Gardner Means, THE AMERICAN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932), remains
in print today.
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rise to a common-law action for fraud and deceit.z36 In such a scena-
rio, "any purchaser in the market would seem to have an action in
deceit or fraud for damage suffered therefrom. 2 37 According to Pro-
fessor Berle, the common law provided that if an individual:
circulates a false report as to the earnings of a particular corpora-
tion which affects the price of its stock thereby subserving his own
concealed interest, relief may be had against him by any person
buying or selling in the market, where it appears that the report was
designed to affect the market. It may be asked if this is a variation
of the common law rule that the statement must be intended to be
relied upon. Obviously not; for while the maker of the false repre-
sentations has not singled out a specific individual for his victim, he
has tossed his squib into a crowd, one or many of whom may be hit;
and this fact is, or at least should be, known to him.2 38
The plaintiff, in such a case, would not be required to prove that he
knew of specific misrepresentations, for one who relies on the market
has indirectly relied on the misrepresentation itself.23 9 One can only
conclude the Mirkin court ignored this tenet of American common
law and the clear history of California and American common-law
fraud cases allowing "indirect" or "market" reliance as a substitute for
actual reliance.
IV. Dealing with the Threat of Punitive Awards in Securities
Fraud Class Actions Brought Under the Common
Law of Deceit
The Mirkin court would not countenance the availability of puni-
tive awards in class actions for securities fraud, and it used this point
236. Berle, Liability, supra note 210, at 269 (footnotes omitted). In 1931, Professor
Berle wrote:
It seems to be an established rule of law that any statement of any kind issued by
anyone and intended to affect the price of, or to be used in appraising a security
must be accurate; and that the knowing publisher of false information is liable in
an action of fraud to anyone who relies on it, or, probably, even to anyone who
acts to his loss in the open market on a false valuation as a result of such
statement.
Id. at 268 (emphasis added).
237. Id.
238. Id. at 270 (emphasis added). Other commentators of the time also acknowledged
that a market fraud action existed in American law under a "free and open market con-
cept." James W. Moore & Frank M. Wiseman, Market Manipulation and the Exchange
Ac4 2 U. Cm. L. REv. 46, 71 (1934). Under this concept, like that of market reliance,
"third persons generally" who relied on an artificially inflated stock price could bring an
action against the malfeasants by asserting the right to a free and open market. Id. These
commentators concluded that the law protecting investors under this concept was changed
little under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Id.
239. Berle, Market Manipulation, supra note 211, at 394.
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to argue against the common-law cause of action.240 The court dis-
cussed the failure of the federal securities laws to authorize punitive
awards and the extensive development of policy choices made by the
federal judiciary against punitive damages in these suits. 241 It con-
cluded "the federal decisions reflect a longstanding consensus that
'the burden on the securities business from punitive damages... out-
weigh[s] their contribution to enforcement of securities laws.' ' 242 The
court also went further, and postulated that allowing punitive dam-
ages would increase the settlement value of marginal claims.243 For
these reasons, the Mirkin court was unwilling to establish a market-
fraud action under common law, which would allow the possibility of
punitive awards.
There are several reasons suggesting that the Mirkin court over-
stated its apprehension of punitive damages being imposed in a com-
mon law market-fraud action. Punitive awards in securities cases are
exceedingly rare 4" and when imposed, they may serve their proper
functions of retribution and deterrence. 245 Moreover, restraints im-
posed by judicial review and legislatively created controls greatly limit
the danger of juries' imposing the devastating awards of which the
Mirkin court complained.246 Thus, it is questionable whether the
availability of punitive awards in certain securities-fraud cases would
unfairly shift the balance of power to favor investors in such cases, as
posited by the Mirkin court. Other state courts will likely revisit is-
sues raised by the Mirkin court regarding punitive damages in securi-
ties fraud class actions, and they should not be persuaded by the
Mirkin court's dicta on this issue.
A. The Purposes of Punitive Damages
Punitive damages have existed in English common law since
before the eighteenth century, and for over a century they have ex-
240. See supra notes 149-52 and accompanying text.
241. Mirkin v. Wasserman, 858 P.2d 568, 582 (Cal. 1993). The court pointed out that
the purposes of retribution and deterrence were not served by allowing punitive awards in
securities-fraud cases. Id. at 583 (citing, inter alia, Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291, 303
(2d Cir. 1968)); see supra note 150.
242. Id. at 582 (quoting Carras v. Bums, 516 F.2d 251, 260 (4th Cir. 1975)).
243. Id. at 583.
244. Federal judges interpret the securities laws as providing no basis for punitive dam-
ages in Rule 10b-5 suits. See, e.g., Carras, 516 F.2d at 259-60 (section 28(a) of the 1934 Act
limits private suits under Rule 10b-5 to actual damages); deHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co.,
435 F.2d 1223, 1231 (same); Green, 406 F.2d at 303 (same). There is no evidence of these
awards in the market-fraud cases brought under the common law of deceit.
245. See infra notes 248-261 and accompanying text.
246. See infra notes 262-78, 285-92, and accompanying text.
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isted in the common law of this country.2 47 During this time, juries
have been deciding these awards under the discretion given them by
the trial judge. Traditional thought is that punitive awards serve two
purposes, retribution and deterrence.248 The principle of retribution is
that wrongdoers must be punished and shown the effect of their culpa-
ble acts.2 49 Punishment shows the "truth about the relative value of
wrongdoer and victim by inflicting a publicly visible defeat on the
wrongdoer."250 Deterrence is the principle that fear of punishment
prevents people from disobeying the law.251 Forcing wrongdoers to
pay compensation for their acts to eliminate any benefits they may
receive from their harmful activity serves the purpose of
deterrence 52
The Mirkin court and some federal courts have reasoned that al-
lowing punitive awards in class actions for securities fraud does not
serve the deterrence or retribution functions.253 For example, in the
247. See Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1991) (discussing the
long-standing nature of punitive damages in the common law and their development in
American tort law). In California, the doctrine of punitive damages was adopted from the
common law when California law was codified in 1872. See, e.g., CA_ CV. CODE § 3294
(West 1985) (punitive damages statute); Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348,
380 (Ct. App. 1981) (discussing the development of the concept of punitive damages in
California and the English common law).
248. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 15-16. The Court in Haslip reaffirmed that this has long been
the accepted common-law method for determining punitive awards:
"It is a well-established principle of the common law, that.., a jury may inflict
what are called exemplary, punitive, or vindictive damages upon a defendant,
having in view the enormity of his offence rather than the measure of compensa-
tion to the plaintiff.... [O]f what the law is, the question will not admit of
argument. By the common as well as by statute law, men are often punished for
aggravated misconduct or lawless acts, by means of a civil action, and the dam-
ages, inflicted by way of penalty or punishment, given to the party injured.
This has been always left to the discretion of the jury, as the degree of
punishment to be thus inflicted must depend on the peculiar circumstances of
each case."
lit (quoting Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 363, 371 (1852)); see also, e.g., RE-
STATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 908 cmt. a (1977); KEETON Er AL., supra note 56, § 2, at
9-10; Marc Galanter & David Luban, Poetic Justice: Punitive Damages and Legal Plural-
ism, 42 Am. U. L. REv. 1393, 1427-29 (1993).
249. Seee g., KEETON Er A.., supra note 56, § 2, at 9; Galanter & Luban, supra note
248, at 1432-33.
250. Galanter & Luban, supra note 248, at 1432.
251. See, eg., KEETON Er AL., supra note 56, § 2, at 9 & n.21; Galanter & Luban, supra
note 248, at 1429, 1447.
252. See, e.g., Galanter & Luban, supra note 248, at 1447 (discussing economic analysis
of deterrence).
253. See Mirkin v. Wasserman, 858 P.2d 568,583 (Cal. 1993); Carras v. Burns, 516 F.2d
251, 260 (4th Cir. 1975); deHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 435 F.2d 1223, 1231 (10th Cir.
1970); Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291, 303 (2d Cir. 1968).
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view of the Mirkin court, the sizable actual damage awards in these
cases already serve the deterrence function, and criminal sanctions al-
ready serve the retribution function.254 Some commentators argue
that punitive damages serve a purpose independent of criminal sanc-
tions255 and play an important role in policing egregious corporate
behavior.
256
For example, while criminal sanctions are typically associated
with individuals, punitive damages tend to "target the dominant party
in the original transaction ... which is often an organization rather
than an individual. ' 257 Indeed, who could forget that for years, Ford
Motor Company was associated with its Pintos that exploded on im-
pact.258 Presently, the law firm of Baker & McKenzie is popularly
associated with a sexual harassment lawsuit,259 and many of us associ-
ate McDonald's with serving scalding coffee.260 In each of these cases
254. Mirkin, 858 P.2d at 583.
255. Galanter & Luban, supra note 248, at 1428-61. For example, Professors Galanter
and Luban state:
[C]ivil punishments contravene the reigning impulse to disassociate law from mo-
rality. Plaintiffs' lawyers typically counsel their clients to disregard their moral
claims and be concerned about the bottom line; defense lawyers strive to dissoci-
ate compensation from the connotation of wrongdoing. Most settlements include
a disclaimer of liability; often these are absurd, as in the case of the corporation
that pays tens of millions of dollars "just to avoid the expense of litigation." This
dissociation of law and morality is evident even in criminal prosecutions. Blame
is deflected to meddlesome or overwrought accusers, and wrongdoers present
themselves as victims bravely coping with the technical problem of entanglement
with the legal system. That is where punitive damages come in: they are perhaps
the most important instrument in the legal repertoire for pronouncing moral disap-
proval of economically formidable offenders.
Id. at 1428 (emphasis added).
256. See, e.g., id. at 1428-61 (asserting that punitive damages are not an anomaly, but a
long-recognized form of punishment useful in policing corporate behavior); Michael Rus-
tad & Thomas Koenig, The Historical Continuity of Punitive Damages Awards: Reforming
the Tort Reformers, 42 AM. U. L. REv. 1269, 1317 (1993) (punitive damages deter the abuse
of power); Teresa Schwartz, Punitive Damages and Regulated Products, 42 AM. U. L. REv.
1345, 1346 (1993) (punitive damages might be justified in cases of outrageous corporate
conduct).
257. Galanter & Luban, supra note 248, at 1426.
258. See, e.g., Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (Ct. App. 1981) (case in
which jury awarded $125 million in punitive damages to plaintiff burned in Pinto accident).
259. See infra note 271 and accompanying text.
260. See, e.g., Denise Gallene, A Hot Tip for Coffee Lovers: Most Retailers Prefer It
Scalding, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 16, 1994, at D3; Dan Shaw, Coffee, Tea or Ouch?, N.Y. TiMES,
Oct. 12, 1994, at Cl; Big Jury Award for Coffee Bum, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 19, 1994, at D5.
It should be noted that while advocates of tort reform cite this case as the "poster
child" of what is wrong with the current civil justice system, the facts of the case truly
refute such a conclusion. See S. Reed Morgan, A Slow Burn over Fast Food, THE RE-
CORDER (S.F.), Sept. 30, 1994, at 8 (commentary by plaintiff's lawyer noting all the facts
presented to the jury). In the end, be it the punitive award, which was reduced to $480,000,
or public disclosure of the fact that McDonald's was hit with the punitive award for know-
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the punitive-damage awards became popular in news media, effec-
tively labeling the organizations for their conduct. These awards
doubtless created a stigma apart from any criminal sanction that could
have applied.261 The negative impact on the economic goodwill of
companies marked by punitive awards must deter their harmful
conduct.
B. Procedural Protections in Punitive Damages Cases
One reason why the threat of punitive damage awards is not so
great as to weigh against a market-fraud common-law remedy is that
the jury's instruction and its determination are subject to trial and ap-
pellate court review to ensure they are reasonable, and at any point
during this process a judge may overturn or reduce the award. In
1991, the United States Supreme Court in Pacific Mutual Life Insur-
ance Company v. Haslip262 applied a three-tier approach in scrutiniz-
ing the constitutionality of a state's procedure in affixing punitive
awards. Two terms after Haslip, the Court reaffirmed this procedure
of review in TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources.263 Further,
one year after the Mirkin decision, the Court established trial and ap-
pellate court review of punitive awards as due process requirements in
Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg.264 The Mirkin court did not mention any
procedural protections afforded defendants of punitive awards when it
decided common-law securities class actions would be too favorable to
investors.
First, courts must satisfy themselves instructions to the jury re-
garding punitive damages are adequate and meaningful. According to
the Supreme Court, due process requires that jury discretion be "exer-
cised within reasonable constraints. ''265 Courts reviewing the award
must be certain that the jury instruction imposed a definite and mean-
ingful constraint upon the jury and that the jury acted within that con-
straint.266 In Haslip, the Court approved an Alabama instruction that
informed the jury of the purpose of punitive damages and that their
imposition was not compulsory.267
ingly serving coffee at a temperature of 190 degrees Fahrenheit, which caused third degree
bums, McDonald's now serves its coffee a little cooler. hd
261. This does not mean that criminal sanctions cannot create such a stigma. Michael
Milken's trip to federal prison was a spectacle. However, criminal sanctions do not always
issue when there is egregious corporate behavior in the securities markets.
262. 499 U.S. 1 (1991).
263. 113 S. Ct. 2711, 2720 (1993).
264. Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 114 S. Ct. 2331, 2340-41 (1994).
265. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 20.
266. See ia at 22.
267. Id. at 19-20.
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Second, post-trial procedures must be conducted applying stan-
dards that provide "meaningful and adequate review by the trial
court" of the jury award.268 This is a critical stage in assessing punitive
awards because trial and appellate judges frequently reduce such jury
awards.269 For example, the jury in the McDonald's coffee case
awarded the plaintiff $2.7 million in punitive damages, but the trial
judge reduced the award to $480,000.270 In the Baker & McKenzie
case, the jury awarded the plaintiff $6.9 million in punitive damages,
but the trial judge reduced that award by nearly fifty percent.2
71
268. Id. at 20. The Court found satisfactory the Alabama trial court considerations of
"the 'culpability of the defendant's conduct,' the 'desirability of discouraging others from
similar conduct,' the 'impact upon the parties,' and 'other factors, such as the impact on
innocent third parties."' Id. (quoting Hammond v. Gadsden, 493 So. 2d 1374, 1379 (Ala.
1986)). The Court approved these factors considered under Alabama law in post-trial and
appellate review when determining the propriety of a punitive award:
(a) whether there is a reasonable relationship between the punitive damages
award and the harm likely to result from the defendant's conduct as well as the
harm that actually has occurred; (b) the degree of reprehensibilty of the defend-
ant's conduct, the duration of that conduct, the defendant's awareness, any con-
cealment, and the existence and frequency of similar past conduct; (c) the
profitability to the defendant of the wrongful conduct and the desirability of re-
moving that profit and of having the defendant also sustain a loss; (d) the 'finan-
cial position' of the defendant; (e) all the costs of litigation; (f) the imposition of
criminal sanctions on the defendant for its conduct, these to be taken in mitiga-
tion; and (g) the existence of other civil awards against the defendant for the
same conduct, these also to be taken in mitigation.
Id. at 21-22.
269. See, e.g., Galanter & Luban, supra note 248, at 1408-14 (reporting empirical stud-
ies on the frequency of remittitur). Indeed, judges may decide to withhold the award alto-
gether. See also KEETON ET AL., supra note 56, § 2, at 14 (citing cases).
270. See, e.g., Judge Cuts Award in Scalding-Coffee Suit to $640,000, L.A. TIMES, Sept.
15, 1994, at D2; McDonald's Coffee Award Reduced 75% by Judge, WALL ST. J., Sept. 15,
1994, at A4.
271. Weeks v. Baker & McKenzie, No. 943043, 1994 WL 774633, at *1 (Cal. Super. Ct.
Nov. 28, 1994) (opinion and order on motions for new trial and judgment notwithstanding
the verdict).
California courts review the propriety of jury instructions and the subsequent awards
given thereunder by looking at three factors, the process of which is not very different than
that used by the Alabama courts reviewed in Haslip. California trial and appellate courts
assess punitive awards by looking at three factors: (1) the reprehensibility of the defend-
ant's conduct, (2) whether the award will have a deterrent effect on the defendant given
the defendant's financial condition, and (3) whether the award bears a reasonable relation
to the injury, harm, or damage actually suffered by the plaintiff. See, e.g., Adams v.
Murakami, 813 P.2d 1348, 1350 (Cal. 1991); Neal v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 582 P.2d 980, 990
(Cal. 1978); 2 COMMITTEE ON STANDARD JURY INsTRUCTIONS, SUPERIOR COURT OF L.A.
COUNTY, BOOK OF APPROVED JURY INSTRUCTIONS [BAJI] No. 14.71, at 323-24 (West
1994). This same analysis was used by the trial judge in Baker & McKenzie to reduce the
award from $6.9 million to $3.5 million. Weeks v. Baker & McKenzie, No. 943043, 1994
WL 774633, at *1 (Cal. Super. Ct. Nov. 28, 1994) (opinion and order). The Alabama in-
struction approved in Haslip asked the jury to consider at least two of these factors. The
instruction asked the jurors to "take into consideration the character and the degree of the
[Vol. 46
Third, review by the state supreme court provides, another check
on the jury award.272 In Haslip, the Court approved of the Alabama
Supreme Court's use of a comparative analysis to determine the ap-
propriateness of the punitive award given other punitive awards in
similar cases,273 and a substantive analysis ensuring that the award is
not excessive in its purpose to punish and deter.274
Finally, in Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, the United States Supreme
Court held that judicial review of the size of punitive damage awards
is guaranteed by the Due Process Clause.275 In Oberg, an Oregon jury
awarded the plaintiff $5 million in punitive damages; Honda sought,
but was denied, procedural review of the award because no basis for
such review existed in Oregon law.276 In an opinion written by Justice
Stevens, the Court underlined the importance of procedural protec-
tions against arbitrary deprivations of property through excessive pu-
nitive awards. 277 The Court's careful analysis outlined the history of
judicial review of punitive awards since the earliest reported punitive
damage cases of over two centuries ago in the English Court of Com-
mon Pleas. Finding that federal courts and every state except for Ore-
gon provided judicial review, the Court concluded that judicial review
was so well established as traditional common law that it could not be
abrogated without presuming a violation of the Due Process
Clause.278 Hence, any court not providing judicial review of punitive
awards denies a litigant's due process rights.
C. Speculation Regarding the Effect of Punitive Damages on Marginal
Claims
The Mirkin court's assertion that the threat of punitive damages
would increase the settlement value of marginal claims is speculation.
The court's premise was that the merits of securities fraud class ac-
tions have no relation to the dollar amount for which these cases set-
tle.279 Claims for punitive damages may affect settlement values.2 0
wrong as shown by the evidence and necessity of preventing similar wrong." 499 U.S. at
19. The Alabama Supreme Court review of the punitive award in Haslip included an as-
sessment applying each of the three California factors. Id. at 21-22.
272. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 20-21.
273. Id. at 21, 41-42 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment); cf. TXO Prod. Corp. v.
Alliance Resources, 113 S. Ct. 2711,2720 (1993) ("Because no two cases are truly identical,
meaningful comparisons of such awards are difficult to make").
274. Id. at 20-21. The Alabama Supreme Court looked at seven factors in its analysis.
See supra note 268.
275. 114 S. Ct. 2331, 2341 (1994).
276. Id. at 2334.
277. Id. at 2340.
278. Id. at 2335-38.
279. Mirkin v. Wasserman, 858 P.2d 568, 583 (Cal. 1993) (citing Janet C. Alexander, Do
the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REv. 497
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Presumably, parties to a suit for securities fraud will also consider:
judges' reluctance to impose punitive damages in securities fraud class
actions; the rare instances in which punitive awards occur; and the
relative frequency of remittitur.281 It seems most logical that settle-
ment values will significantly increase only in those cases where the
evidence suggests a punitive award may be in order. This is not to say
that the prospect of punitive awards in class actions for securities
fraud creates no cause for concern. Allowing punitive awards in these
cases creates potentially damning awards upon a finding of liability.
Ultimately however, any limitation of punitive damages in securities
suits brought under state law is more properly a question for state
legislatures to decide.282
D. Statutory Controls on Punitive Damages
The arguments for and against punitive awards in securities suits
are part of a larger "tort-reform" debate encompassing punitive
awards in tort suits in general. In this debate some judges and com-
mentators are calling for legislative action because, in their view, legis-
latures are best equipped to balance the interests of consumers,
investors, and companies. 283 Congress has responded by drafting leg-
(1991)). This assumption has been called into question by many commentators. See, e.g.,
Steven P. Marino & Renee D. Marino, An Empirical Study of Recent Securities Class Ac-
tion Settlements Involving Accountants, Attorneys, or Underwriters, 22 SEc. REG. L.J. 115,
142 (1994); Adam F. Ingber, Note, lOb-5 or Not 10b-5?: Are the Current Efforts to Reform
Securities Litigation Misguided?, 61 FORDHAM L. REv. S351, S362-63 & n.78 (1993); In
Camera, 14 CLASs AcrION REP. 1, 70 (1991). See generally Leonard B. Simon & William
S. Dato, Don't the Merits Matter? A Critique of Professor Alexander's Study of Settle-
ments in Securities Class Actions, and a Fresh Look at a Broader Data Sample (attacking
study as riddled with "significant methodological errors") (Jan. 22, 1995) (unpublished arti-
cle, on file with the Hastings Law Journal).
280. See Galanter & Luban, supra note 248, at 1414 (discussing cases in which the
threat of punitive damages affected pre-trial investigation and settlement negotiation).
281. See, e.g., id. at 1408-14 (reporting empirical studies on the frequency of punitive
awards and remittitur); Marino & Marino, supra note 279, at 142 (discussing the many
factors that affect settlement awards).
282. See Mirkin, 858 P.2d at 582. Although the Mirkin court believed a common law
market-fraud action would be contrary to the existing California statutory law, it is clear
the court accepted that this area of law is more suited for legislative than for judicial delib-
eration. Id.
283. See, e.g., Foreword to Symposium on Civil Justice Reform, 42 AM. U. L. REv. 1245
(1993) (discussing views of advocates and critics of tort reform); Dan Quayle, Civil Justice
Reform, 41 AM. U. L. REv. 559, 559-61 (1992) (criticizing punitive awards and advocating
Bush Administration's proposal for reform); Victor E. Schwartz & Mark A. Behrens, Puni-
tive Damages Reform-State Legislatures Can and Should Meet the Challenge Issued by the
Supreme Court of the United States in Haslip, 42 AM. U. L. Rav. 1365, 1367 (1993) (advo-
cating legislative reform of punitive damages law); Alex Kozinski, The Case of Punitive
Damages v. Democracy, WALL ST. J., Jan. 19, 1995, at A16 (Judge, Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals) ("the emerging trend of empowering juries to act as mini-legislatures is at odds
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islation in both houses.3 4 Also, many state legislatures have already
responded to these concerns by enacting controls on punitive awards
not present in California law.8 5 Thus, specific limits on punitive
awards in many of these states alleviate the Mirkin court's concerns
regarding the looming threat of huge punitive awards in securities
suits. Furthermore, it seems that the failure of the legislatures in these
states to enact specific controls in class actions or securities cases
would speak against a substantive attack on punitive awards in such
cases.
The several significant controls on punitive damages existing in
state law throughout the United States include: (1) heightened stan-
dards for liability; (2) judge-determined punitive awards; and (3) puni-
tive award caps. Ten states have statutes requiring that plaintiffs
prove defendants acted with malice to justify a punitive award.286 In
Maryland and Maine, these heightened standards of liability are in
case law.287 In three states, once a jury decides that punitive damages
are appropriate, the judge is entrusted with setting the actual damage
award.288 Nine states have enacted statutes limiting punitive awards
by some form of a cap: three states have fixed ceilings on punitive
damages;289 five other states limit punitive awards to a multiple of the
with the central democratic principle that policy questions are decided by the people's
elected representatives").
284. See supra note 2.
285. See infra notes 286-92 and accompanying text.
286. See ARIZ. IEv. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-653.02 to 653.03 (1992) (requiring showing of
actual malice in certain tort actions); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 6855 (1989) (malice or
willful wanton misconduct in health care malpractice actions); MoNT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-
221 (1993) (actual malice or actual fraud); NEv. REv. STAT. § 42.005 (Supp. 1993) (oppres-
sion, fraud, or malice, express or implied, in breach of noncontractual obligation); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-5 (West 1987) (actual malice in product liability suits); OHIo REv.
CoDE ANN. § 2315-21 (Baldwin 1992) (acts or omissions of defendant must demonstrate
malice, aggravated or egregious fraud, oppression, or insult); R.L GEN. LAWS § 28-5-29.1
(Supp. 1994) (malice or ill will); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 21-1-4.1 (1987) (willful, wan-
ton, or malicious conduct); 1995 Tex. Gen. Laws 19 (to be codified at TEx. Crv. PRAc. &
REM. CODE ANN. § 41.003(B)) (malice). California also requires a showing of malice.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294 (West Supp. 1995).
287. See Tuttle v. Raymond, 494 A.2d 1353, 1361-62 (Me. 1985) (plaintiffs must prove
express or implied malice to recover punitive award); Owens-Illinois v. Zenobia, 601 A.2d
633, 653 (Md. 1992) (actual malice).
288. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-240b (West 1991) (limited to product liability
actions); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 60-3701(a)-(b), -3702(a)-(b) (1994); OHIO REv. CODE ANN.
§ 2315.21(B) (Anderson Supp. 1987).
289. See GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1(g) (1990) ($250,000 except in certain product lia-
bility actions); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-38.1 (Michie 1992) ($350,000). Alabama had a simi-
lar cap on punitive damages ($250,000), ALA. CODE § 6-11-21(1) (1993), but it was found
unconstitutional under the Alabama constitution for unduly displacing the jury's discretion
to make the award. Henderson v. Alabama Power Co., 627 So. 2d 878, 893 (1993).
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compensatory damages;290 and Kansas limits punitive damages to the
lesser of five million dollars or the "defendant's highest gross annual
income earned for any of the five years" preceding the act that
prompted the lawsuit.291 Finally, Louisiana, Michigan, Nebraska, and
New Hampshire have eliminated the availability of punitive awards
completely. 292 Thus, in many states existing legislative and judge-
made controls greatly temper the threat of punitive damages in securi-
ties-fraud suits.
The California statutory scheme addressing the sale of securities
is somewhat more sophisticated than that of many states, but it clearly
states that it is designed to supplement and not replace existing statu-
tory and common law remedies.293 One of these long-standing statu-
tory remedies is the punitive damage award in cases of fraud, which is
available under section 3294 of the California Civil Code.294 The Cali-
fornia legislature has not expressly restricted or otherwise defined the
boundaries of remedies available for securities investors. This sug-
gests that the Mirkin court's finding that a market-fraud class action
with the possibility of punitive damages would be against policies in-
herent in California law is incorrect. Even assuming there is no sup-
port for sustaining a market-fraud class action under the California
statutory framework, the Mirkin court's characterization of the puni-
tive damages "threat" appears to be an overestimation. There are
substantial procedural protections in the administration of punitive
awards, and there is no credible evidence to suggest that such a threat
290. See COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 13-21-102(1)(a), (3) (1989) (punitive damages limited to
amount of actual damages, unless harmful conduct continues during trial, in which case
limit increases to three times actual damages); FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 768.73 (West 1995)
(limited to three times compensatory damages unless there is clear and convincing evi-
dence to justify more); NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. § 42.005 (Michie Supp. 1993) (limited to
$300,000 when compensatory damages are less than $100,000, and no greater than three
times compensatory damages when such damages are $100,000 or more); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 23, § 9A (West 1987) (punitive damages limited to amount of actual damages,
limit increases in court's discretion when oppression, fraud or malice is shown by clear and
convincing evidence); 1995 Tex. Gen. Laws 19 (to be codified at TEX. CiV. PRAC. & REM.
CODE ANN. 41.008(B)) (limited to the greater of: (1) two times economic damages plus an
amount equal to noneconomic damages not exceeding $750,000; or (2) $200,000).
291. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3701(e) (1993). The cap may be exceeded if the plain-
tiff proves that the defendant expected to make a profit exceeding the cap through his
harmful activity. See § 60-3701(f).
292. See LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 3546 (West 1994) (prohibiting punitive awards);
MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2911 (West 1995) (same in libel and slander cases); N.H.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 507:16 (1991) (prohibiting punitive awards unless authorized by stat-
ute); Abel v. Conover, 104 N.W.2d 684, 689 (Neb. 1960) (holding that state constitution
prevents punitive awards).
293. CAL. CORP. CODE § 25510 (West 1977); see also Bowden v. Robinson, 136 Cal.
Rptr. 871, 879 (Ct. App. 1977) (Corporate Securities Act of 1968 supplements existing
remedies).
294. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294 (West Supp. 1995).
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would significantly bolster marginal claims. Absent express statutory
or case law to the contrary, the market-fraud action should be avail-
able in other states. There is even less reason to share the concerns of
the Mirkin court in those states where punitive damages are not avail-
able or are limited by statute. In sum, a common-law fraud remedy in
securities class action suits would not unfairly shift the law in favor of
investors.
Conclusion
What seems new often has ancient roots. In deciding whether to
"incorporate" the fraud-on-the-market theory into the common law of
deceit, the Mirkin court overlooked the fact it was the fraud-on-the-
market theory that likely incorporated the common law of deceit. In-
stead of weighing policies against creating a "new" law, the Mirkin
court should have been weighing policies against changing a law with
antecedents dating from the origin pf deceit as a tort.
Principles of market reliance developed at early common law and
were incorporated to the American law of deceit. Judges crafted
these principles to protect investors buying securities in the open mar-
ket. American courts (including California courts) and respected au-
thorities on securities law embraced market-reliance principles. The
United States Supreme Court applied the same principles when they
resurfaced in securities-fraud suits brought by investors under Rule
10b-5. When asked to acknowledge market-reliance principles in the
common law of deceit, the California Supreme Court incorrectly de-
nied their existence.
As Congress modifies the federal securities laws to retract inves-
tors' rights, defrauded investors will seek remedies in state courts. In
California, these investors often will have no remedy for being de-
frauded when buying securities in the open market. Elsewhere, these
plaintiffs will ask the courts to apply principles of market reliance, like
defrauded investors asked the courts years before enactment of the
federal securities laws. Courts hearing these cases should forthrightly
acknowledge market-reliance principles in the common law of deceit
and not be influenced by the exaggerated threat of punitive damages
as discussed in the Mirkin case.
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